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PROTECTION: NONDISCLOSURE AS 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
ETHAN L. CARROLL† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Speech or Debate Clause encompasses certain privileges that 
inure to the benefit of legislators. But its nondisclosure protection 
secures legislative—not legislators’—independence. This 
nondisclosure protection provides Congress as an institution the 
procedural right to assert its interests prior to the executive branch’s 
compelling the disclosure of legislative acts and corresponding 
documentary materials. Reading the opinion of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Building as a separation-of-powers case distinguishes this 
institutional, procedural protection from a so-called “nondisclosure 
privilege” against any compelled disclosure, which was rejected by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Renzi. 
The D.C. Circuit’s construction of the Speech or Debate Clause in 
Rayburn leaves executive-branch officials considerable latitude to 
investigate Members of Congress, subject to procedural constraints.  
Because the value the Clause protects is democratic representation, 
rather than legislative independence per se, the question of 
nondisclosure is one of protective procedure, not of privilege: 
Congress, not the executive branch, gets to make first determinations 
as to privilege. 
INTRODUCTION 
James Madison wrote in The Federalist that after defining the 
three classes of constitutional power—“legislative, executive, and 
 
Copyright © 2014 Ethan L. Carroll. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2014; University of Virginia, M.P.P. 
2010, B.A. 2009. Thank you to Professor H. Jefferson Powell for serving as a willing mentor and 
sounding board for ideas; to Professor Guy Charles for always having an open door; to the 
editors of the Duke Law Journal for their diligent efforts, with special gratitude to Taylor 
Crabtree; and to my parents for their support. 
CARROLL IN PP CLEAN VERSION (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:51 AM 
1154 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1153 
judiciary”—“the next and most difficult task” was “to provide some 
practical security for each against the invasion of the others.”1 
Originally written in outlining the American constitutional scheme 
for separation of powers, these words assumed new significance 218 
years later when, on May 20, 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) officials entered, sealed, and searched the congressional office 
of then-Congressman William Jefferson, the first time an executive 
agency had ever searched without permission the Capitol Hill office 
of a sitting Member of Congress.2 
A few months later,3 federal prosecutors opened an investigation 
of then-Congressman Richard Renzi for honest services wire fraud in 
connection with his allegedly bribed promises to sponsor federal 
public-land-exchange legislation.4 In the course of the investigation 
and pursuant to a Title III order,5 the FBI tapped the Congressman’s 
personal cell phone.6 The FBI also reviewed documents Congressman 
Renzi’s aide took from the Congressman’s office.7 
Congressmen Renzi and Jefferson both challenged the respective 
investigations as violating Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution (the Speech or Debate Clause),8 which provides that 
“for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned.”9 The D.C. Circuit’s holding 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2. David Stout, Ex-Louisiana Congressman Sentenced to 13 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2009, at A14. 
 3. Max Blumenthal, Porn Cop vs. US Attorney, NATION, Apr. 9, 2007, at 6. 
 4. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 5. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 197, 221 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)) (establishing procedures 
for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by government officials). 
 6. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1018 n.6. 
 7. Id.  
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 9. Id. The full text of the Clause is as follows: 
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to 
be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall 
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going 
to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.  
Id. (emphasis added). Throughout this Note, the word “they” is replaced with “Senators and 
Representatives,” as “they” most naturally reads as referring to the direct object of the 
paragraph, “The Senators and Representatives.” Cf. Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or Debate 
Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or Non-Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 396 
(2012) (“[The Clause] has a direct object: ‘they,’ the ‘Senators and Representatives’ who are 
questioned.”).  
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in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building10 that “the 
compelled disclosure of privileged material to the Executive during 
execution of the search warrant . . . [for Congressman Jefferson’s 
office] violated the Speech or Debate Clause”11 set off a firestorm of 
commentary, as it was the first time a federal court of appeals had 
construed the Clause to encompass a “nondisclosure privilege.”12 The 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Renzi13 declined to follow the D.C. 
Circuit, refusing to recognize this “grandiose, yet apparently shy, 
privilege of non-disclosure,”14 which “would jeopardize law 
enforcement tools that have never been considered problematic.”15 
The Speech or Debate Clause (the Clause) “protect[s] against 
possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a 
hostile judiciary.”16 The paradigmatic abuse against which the Clause 
protects is an executive-branch official harassing a legislator and that 
harassment influencing the legislator’s vote, thus frustrating 
democratic representation.17 As such, the Clause safeguards 
 
 10. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 11. Id. at 656. 
 12. In many instances, this Note refers to the Clause’s protection of Members from 
executive-branch-compelled disclosure of legislative-act material as a “nondisclosure 
privilege”—a turn of phrase introduced by the Renzi court—despite the Note’s conclusion that 
the term is a misnomer, as the Clause is better thought of as encompassing an institutional 
nondisclosure protection. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. The latter terminology 
avoids conflating the evidentiary privileges the Clause affords individual Members with its 
protection of Congress as an institution. 
 13. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 14. Id. at 1032. 
 15. Id. at 1034 (quoting Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 16. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178–79 (1966) (discerning this purpose from 
the Clause’s role in English constitutional history prior to the Glorious Revolution). The 
Clause’s history is outlined in much greater and more critical detail elsewhere. See generally 
Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973). For a discussion of the Clause’s origin in Article IX of the 
English Bill of Rights, see infra Part III.C.1.  
 17. See David M. Lederkramer, Note, A Statutory Proposal for Case-by-Case 
Congressional Waiver of the Speech or Debate Privilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 
465, 492–95 (1981) (demonstrating the potential for the executive branch to control legislators’ 
behavior). For discussion of what I have chosen to call the Clause’s representation principle, see 
infra notes 160, 202 and accompanying text. Cf. generally Anita Bernstein, Note, Executive 
Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the Arrest Clause, 94 YALE L.J. 647 (1985) (arguing 
that executive-branch targeting of Members, as in the ABSCAM investigation, violates the 
Arrest Clause and ultimately harms constituents by preventing their full participation in the 
legislative process); Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address 
at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940) (“With the law books filled with a great assortment of 
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democratic representation and legislative independence by endowing 
Members with certain privileges.18 This Note argues, however, that 
the Clause does not vest in each individual Member an absolute 
privilege against the compelled disclosure of legislative acts and 
corresponding documentary materials (so-called legislative-act 
materials).19 Instead, it provides Congress as an institution the right to 
assert its institutional interests—often through House or Senate 
Counsel—prior to the executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of 
legislative-act materials. Although the Clause allows Congress to 
resist the executive branch as a matter of political power, it leaves 
prosecutors considerable room to investigate individual Members’ 
alleged wrongdoing, subject to procedural constraints. 
Since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn, much scholarship 
analyzing the Speech or Debate Clause has relied on the separation-
of-powers doctrine—or the balance of powers generally20—to support 
both broad and narrow constructions of the Clause’s scope.21 The 
most persuasive of these explanations and critiques of the Rayburn 
court’s construction of the Clause suggest a wholesale scaling back of 
 
crimes, . . . law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being 
unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political 
views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.”). 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. This Note refers throughout to “legislative acts and corresponding documentary 
materials” as “legislative-act materials.” See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Renzi, 651 
F.3d 1012 (No. 11-557) (referring to “legislative-act materials”). For a discussion of protected 
“legislative acts,” see infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally, e.g., Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of 
Powers: Are Internal Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 595 (2007); A.J. Green, Note, United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or 
Debate Clause To Fight Corruption in Congress Post-Rayburn, 2012 BYU L. REV. 493 (2012). 
Although ultimately misguided, these notes cite to the Supreme Court’s statement, “Our 
task . . . is to apply the Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature 
without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government.” United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972); cf. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as 
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1952 (2011) (“[F]unctionalists view the 
Constitution as emphasizing the balance, and not the separation, of powers.”). 
 21. For a broad construction, see generally, for example, Steven F. Huefner, Congressional 
Searches and Seizures: The Place of Legislative Privilege, 24 J.L. & POL. 271 (2008) (referring 
throughout to the “proper separation of powers”); and Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16 
(calling for separation-of-powers concerns to define the scope of the Clause, which should be 
construed in light of Members’ present-day responsibilities). For a narrow construction, see, for 
example, Harrell, supra note 9 at 388, 404 (balancing a “structural interest in anti-corruption” 
against legislative independence on a separation-of-powers theory that counsels “balancing the 
powers of the federal branches”).  
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the Supreme Court’s Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence,22 a 
qualified privilege in criminal investigations,23 or a presumption 
against search warrants for documentary evidence in congressional 
offices.24 These approaches err, however, in how they apply the 
Court’s separation-of-powers cases to the Speech or Debate Clause 
context. They appeal to the separation-of-powers doctrine in the 
abstract25 or solely in support of leading arguments about the scope of 
the Speech or Debate Clause. And they are not alone—portions of 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Rayburn belie Rayburn’s effect as a 
separation-of-powers case.26 
This Note aims to refocus the discussion about the Clause’s 
nondisclosure protection from the current focus on legislators’ 
independence to a proper focus on legislative independence. To do so, 
it recasts the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Rayburn through separation-
of-powers analysis, emphasizing both the Clause’s institutional value 
and the case’s outcome: the Rayburn court returned to Congressman 
Jefferson the right to make a first determination as to which materials 
were legislative in nature.27 This recasting underscores the limited 
nature of Rayburn’s holding,28 situates Rayburn within the Supreme 
 
 22. One note argues that the evidentiary privilege recognized in United States v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169 (1966), “lacks basis in text or prior precedent,” as does the recognition of a 
nondisclosure privilege in United States v. Rayburn. See Harrell, supra note 9 at 385–88. The 
gravamen of its argument is the claim that courts have erred in “failing to weigh the (admittedly 
important) interest in preserving separation of powers against the federal government’s 
significant interest in combatting bribery among federal legislators.” Id. at 404 (emphasis 
added). This Note responds directly to that argument by outlining the separation-of-powers 
argument with greater precision in Parts III–IV, which are responsive to that note’s approach of 
purporting to “weigh” the executive branch’s interest in policing corruption against Congress’s 
interest in the prior assertion of its privilege. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 23. See generally Recent Case, United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 914 (2008) (arguing by analogy to United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974), that a qualified privilege in criminal investigations of Members would 
satisfy separation-of-powers concerns). 
 24. See generally Huefner, supra note 21. 
 25. For a summary of Professor Manning’s criticism of analysis that relies upon such a 
freestanding separation-of-powers principle, see infra Part IV.A. 
 26. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 655 (2007) 
(“[Resolution of this case] requires . . . a balancing of the separation of powers underlying the 
Speech or Debate Clause and the Executive’s Article II, Section 3 law enforcement interest in 
the seized materials.”). 
 27. Id. at 658. 
 28. Congressman Jefferson prevailed in his claim “only that the warrant 
procedures . . . were flawed because they afforded him no opportunity to assert the privilege 
before the Executive scoured his records.” Id. at 662. 
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Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence,29 and provides the basis 
for concluding that the Ninth Circuit in Renzi not only misconstrued 
the Clause, but also mischaracterized the “nondisclosure privilege” 
that it declined to recognize. The nondisclosure protection is a matter 
of procedure, not privilege: Congress, not the executive branch, gets 
to make first determinations as to the applicability of its privilege. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s Speech 
or Debate Clause cases, before Part II describes the facts of Rayburn 
and Renzi and summarizes each court’s holding in each case. Part III 
reinterprets Rayburn through the lens of formalist separation-of-
powers analysis.30 Part IV then turns to functionalist analysis: Part 
IV.A provides a framework for functionalist separation-of-powers 
analysis. Part IV.B demonstrates that this functionalist analysis would 
reach the same conclusion as the formalist analysis on the facts of 
Rayburn. Part IV.C uses the difference between Rayburn’s outcome 
and that of the Supreme Court’s bribery cases to address the 
arguments of some commentators who would “weigh” or “balance” 
Congress’s interest in the prior assertion of its privilege against 
interests of the executive branch—like policing corruption. Finally, 
Part IV.D argues that the Renzi court erred in failing to critically 
define the nondisclosure protection it refused to recognize. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE CASES 
This Part provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s 
Speech or Debate Clause cases. The next Part builds on the context 
provided here in summarizing the holdings in Rayburn and Renzi. For 
ease of reference, this Part breaks these cases into the categories of 
legislative-immunity cases, bribery cases, and oversight cases, and 
highlights the importance of each kind of case to executive-branch 
investigations of alleged congressional wrongdoing. 
 
 29. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (“In the American governmental 
structure the [Speech or Debate] [C]lause serves the . . . function of reinforcing the separation 
of powers so deliberately established by the Founders.”). The separation of powers is explicitly 
invoked in the Court’s other Speech or Debate Clause cases, too. E.g., United States v. 
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491–92 (1979); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 334 (1973) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972); 
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972). 
 30. The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers cases can be read as existing along a 
formalist/functionalist dichotomy. See Manning, supra note 20, at 1942–43. 
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A. The Legislative-Immunity Cases 
The Speech or Debate Clause received relatively little attention 
during the Constitutional Convention,31 but early judicial decisions 
recognized that the Clause conferred immunity from prosecution for 
legislative acts. An 1808 case in the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, Coffin v. Coffin,32 was the first American case to 
interpret the scope of legislative privilege, construing the 
Massachusetts Constitution—which contained a provision similar to 
the Speech or Debate Clause33—not to protect the slanderous speech 
of Representative Micajah Coffin.34 Coffin’s legacy, however, is not its 
narrow holding but its broad dicta, with Chief Justice Parsons writing 
for the court: 
[T]he article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally . . . . I 
will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or 
haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the 
making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the 
nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the 
article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for 
everything said or done by him as a representative, in the exercise of 
the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise 
was regular, according to the rules of the house, or irregular and 
against their rules. . . . I am satisfied that there are cases in which he 
is entitled to this privilege, when not within the walls of the 
representatives’ chamber.35 
During the first 177 years of the Constitution’s life, the Supreme 
Court construed the Clause only twice. In the first federal case to 
interpret the Speech or Debate Clause, Kilbourn v. Thompson,36 the 
Court quoted Coffin’s dicta with approval.37 It held that Members of 
the House of Representatives were not liable for their vote 
 
 31. For a discussion of the Clause’s drafting history, see infra Part III.C.1. 
 32. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808). 
 33. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided: “The freedom of deliberation, 
speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, 
that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or complaint, in any 
other court or place whatsoever.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXI, reprinted in 3 FRANCIS 
NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1892 (1909). 
 34. Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
 37. See id. at 203–04 (“It seems to us that the views expressed in the authorities we have 
cited are sound and are applicable to this case.”). 
CARROLL IN PP CLEAN VERSION (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:51 AM 
1160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1153 
improperly holding a private citizen in contempt of the House 
because the Speech or Debate Clause protects “things generally done 
in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the 
business before it,” including voting.38 The Court next discussed the 
Clause seventy-one years later in Tenney v. Brandhove,39 holding that 
the predecessor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 198340 did not create civil 
liability for acts done within the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity.41 It also observed that the Clause’s protection attaches—
when it attaches—absolutely.42 The Court later relied upon this 
absolute protection in Dombrowski v. Eastland,43 holding that 
legislators engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” 
are protected “not only from the consequences of litigation’s results, 
but also from the burden of defending themselves.”44 This absolute 
protection would form the basis of the absolute testimonial privilege 
upon which the D.C. Circuit based its decision in Rayburn.45 
B. The Bribery Cases 
The substance of the circuit split between Rayburn and Renzi 
largely stems from a series of prosecutions for bribery. These bribery 
 
 38. Id. at 204–05. This was not a necessary conclusion textually; the Court could have 
construed the Clause’s protections to encompass solely words spoken in debate. Indeed, this 
definition would seem to accord better with the deletion of the words “or proceedings” from the 
text of Article IX of the English Bill of Rights. See Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate 
Clause: Bastion of Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 197, 
206–10 (1979) (“[I]t is more reasonable to assume that the phrase [‘or proceedings’] was omitted 
for the purpose of narrowing the privilege.”). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 
1130 (drawing no meaning from the omission of the word “proceedings” from the Clause). 
 39. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The predecessor statute was 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946). 
 41. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 379. William Brandhove, an unsuccessful mayoral candidate in 
San Francisco, alleged that state legislators sitting on the California Legislature’s Senate Fact-
Finding Committee on Un-American Activities had deprived him of due process and equal 
protection by reading into the legislative record statements—including Brandhove’s “alleged 
criminal record”—meant “to intimidate and silence [him] and deter and prevent him from 
effectively exercising his constitutional righ[t] of free speech.” Id. at 371. 
 42. See id. at 377 (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the 
privilege. . . . The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, that it was not consonant with our 
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained 
unquestioned.” (citation omitted)). But see Note, The Bribed Congressman’s Immunity from 
Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 340 (1965) (noting that applying the holding from Fletcher v. 
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)—against questioning the motives of the legislature—does not 
fairly apply to the motives of legislators).  
 43. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1966) (per curiam). 
 44. Id. at 85. 
 45. See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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cases largely defined the role of the Clause in interbranch 
investigations and litigation, as the Court (1) interpreted the scope of 
the Clause as providing an evidentiary privilege at trial, (2) 
determined that investigations into bribery rest within the purview of 
executive-branch scrutiny rather than solely congressional self-
discipline, and (3) repeatedly declined to address whether Congress 
might waive its Members’ privileges. The next three subsections 
address each of these holdings in turn. 
1. The Clause as an Evidentiary Privilege.  The Court construed 
the Clause as providing an evidentiary privilege in its first bribery-
related Speech or Debate Clause case, United States v. Johnson.46 
There, it held that Representative Thomas F. Johnson’s conviction 
for accepting a payment in exchange for giving a speech on the House 
floor was properly set aside, as a prosecution dependent on inquiries 
into the “legislative acts” of the Member and his motives for 
undertaking them necessarily violated the Clause.47 
Six years later, the Court in United States v. Brewster48 bounded 
the scope of this evidentiary privilege, delimiting the definition of the 
“legislative acts” protected in Johnson to include only “those things 
generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance 
of official duties and [inquiries] into the motivation[s] for those 
acts.”49 It reasoned that a prosecution for bribery does not necessitate 
any inquiry into legislative acts or their motivation, as taking a bribe 
is not a legislative act.50 In the Court’s words, “To make a prima face 
case [of bribery], the Government need not show any 
act . . . subsequent to the corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking 
the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal 
act.”51 
 
 46. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). 
 47. Id. at 184–85. A Maryland savings-and-loan institution had allegedly paid the 
Congressman to make a speech favorable to it, which it planned to distribute in print form to 
allay the fears of potential investors. Though Representative Johnson’s criminal liability for his 
related attempt to influence the Department of Justice to dismiss the pending indictments of the 
savings-and-loan institution and its officers was not before the Court, id. at 171, 186 n.16, the 
Court opined that the Clause would not protect conduct so unrelated to the “due functioning of 
the legislative process,” id. at 172. 
 48. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 512. 
 50. Id. at 526. 
 51. Id. This holding is consistent with the Court’s holding in Johnson. The Court’s inquiry 
in Brewster was whether any case could possibly be made without contravening the Speech or 
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2. The Role of the Executive Branch in Bribery Investigations.  
Resolving the controversy in Brewster also required rejecting Senator 
Daniel Brewster’s contention that alleged bribery was punishable 
only by Congress—rather than by courts—in accordance with 
Congress’s Article I, Section 5 power.52 Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Burger rebuffed this contention with two counterpoints. 
First, he reasoned by analogy to the Court’s past construction of the 
Arrest Clause53 that Members’ facing accountability for bribery solely 
in nonjudicial forums would “render Members of Congress virtually 
immune from a wide range of crimes.”54 Second, he pointed out that 
 
Debate Clause, whereas its inquiry in Johnson had been whether the Speech or Debate Clause 
had in fact been violated upon its review of Representative Johnson’s conviction. See supra note 
47 and accompanying text.  
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two 
thirds, expel a Member.”). A number of commentators have argued that investigations of and 
punishment for bribery may only be carried out by Congress. See, e.g., Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The 
Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 183 
(1973) (arguing that the Constitution requires that discipline of Members of Congress take place 
within Congress or by recourse to the vote, rather than by process of criminal law). See generally 
Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its 
Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
1 (1968). These arguments were effectively precluded by the Court’s strained historical analysis 
in Brewster, discussed within. See infra note 54; cf. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t does not follow that the Framers went further and authorized Congress to 
transfer discipline of bribe takers to the Judicial Branch.”).  
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 54. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 520. A historical point is worth making here because the 
distinction between the respective constitutional provenances of the Arrest Clause and the 
Speech or Debate Clause matters to the analysis within. See infra Part III.C.I. Though the Court 
recognized in Brewster “that the privilege against arrest is not identical with the Speech or 
Debate privilege,” it nevertheless proceeded to reason from the arrest privilege by analogy 
because, in the Court’s words, “[i]t can hardly be thought that the Speech or Debate Clause 
totally protects what the [Arrest Clause] has plainly left open to prosecution, i.e., all criminal 
acts.” Id. at 521. 
  This step is problematic: at least two reasons suggest that the privileges differ in 
coverage. First, and most pragmatically, the two privileges were subject to entirely different 
forms of abuse in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Compare THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 196, 580 (11th ed. 
1960) (noting parliamentary abuse of the privilege from arrest, which had extended to protect 
“not only [Members’] persons, but their property, their servants, and their servants’ property, 
and even to protect their game from poaching”), with Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 (“[The speech or 
debate privilege] has enabled reckless men to slander . . . others with impunity . . . .”). As 
indicated below, these different forms of abuse led to circumscription of the privilege of arrest, 
but not of the privilege of speech and debate. See infra notes 161–67 and accompanying text. 
  Second, and supporting the first point’s distinction between the privileges, is that the 
two privileges are different in origin and served different functions historically. The arrest 
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“[t]he [American] system of divided powers was expressly designed to 
check the abuses England experienced in the 16th to the 18th 
centuries.”55 Accordingly, in considering the Clause’s functional 
 
privilege has roots in the old English curia regis, and it originally protected the king’s courtiers 
in their travel to his side. See 1 WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 156 (4th ed., reissue rev. 1911); PLUCKNETT, supra, at 196; 3 WILLIAM STUBBS, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 512 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 5th ed. 1896). In 
this regard, the arrest privilege was derivative of monarchical supremacy. The privilege of 
speech and debate, on the other hand, was born in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in 
the context of growing legislative power in the face of monarchical opposition. See PLUCKNETT, 
supra, at 247–49, 319–27, 331–464. Thus, one might persuasively argue that the privilege of 
speech and debate, but not the privilege of arrest, is properly the subject of solely legislative 
construction. See supra note 52. The Court’s flawed analysis in failing to recognize these 
differences between the privileges does not change the analysis within, however, which does not 
question the Court’s conclusion that punishment and/or process for bribery should take place in 
the courts rather than in Congress.  
 55. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 523. A further historical point is worth making here because it 
reinforces a major thrust of the argument in this Note—that the Clause is important to 
promoting democratic representation. Beyond failing to disaggregate the above two 
components of English parliamentary privilege (the arrest privilege and the speech-and-debate 
privilege), the Brewster Court supplemented its reasoning by attributing to Parliament’s judicial 
origins Parliament’s power to judge the privileges of its own members. Id. at 518 (citing CARL 
WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE, in OHIO ST. U. BULL., Aug. 
30, 1921, at 1, 14).  
  This attribution glosses over disagreement regarding the origins of the speech-and-
debate privilege. The historical account upon which the Brewster Court relied suggests that “the 
idea that Parliament exercised and enforced its privileges as ‘the High Court of 
Parliament’ . . . was firmly rooted for centuries in the minds of Parliament men, lawyers, and 
judges, and prevailed to modern times.” WITTKE, supra, at 10. This viewpoint—that the 
privilege is an “ancient and undoubted right, and an inheritance received from [Parliament’s] 
ancestors,” see PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 357 (documenting this viewpoint and the 
disagreement)—has been refuted. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1121 & nn.41, 
44 (citing J.E. Neale, The Commons’ Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in 2 HISTORICAL 
STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 147, 147–76 (E.B. Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970)) 
(noting and refuting this same argument that the privilege was judicial in nature and existed 
since before the beginning of the reign of King Henry IV in 1399). 
  A proper understanding of the privilege focuses not on its purported judicial origins, 
but instead on the privilege’s importance to democratic representation. The speech-and-debate 
privilege grew with Parliament’s expanding legislative powers throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. See infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. The House of Commons’s 
assertions of privilege throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may indeed have 
rested their justifications for the privilege in Parliament’s judicial nature. See, e.g., Proceedings 
Against Sir John Elliot (K.B. 1629), in 3 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 293, 296 (London, R. 
Bagshaw et al. 1809) (“Words spoken in Parliament, which is a superior court, cannot be 
questioned in this court, which is inferior.”). As demonstrated elsewhere, however, these claims 
by the House of Commons were aspirational. E.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 249; see Neale, 
supra, at 157–58 (documenting the earliest assertions of privilege and concluding that “[i]t is 
clear that [Sir Thomas] More did not consider his petition a petition of right: free speech [was] 
not yet a formal privilege”). To the extent the claims relied upon history, they were factually 
inaccurate, revisionist accounts of the case of Member Richard Strode, who was convicted in a 
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purpose of “preserv[ing] the independence and thereby the integrity 
of the legislative process,” the Chief Justice reasoned that 
“[d]epriving the Executive of the power to investigate and prosecute 
and the Judiciary of the power to punish bribery of Members of 
Congress is unlikely to enhance legislative independence.”56 
3. Refusal To Consider Waiver. As it had in Johnson, the Court in 
Brewster declined to consider whether Congress might waive its 
individual Members’ privileges by enacting the bribery statute.57 In 
United States v. Helstoski,58 the Court refused once again to find a 
waiver by Congress—in enacting the bribery statute—or by 
Congressman Henry Helstoski, who had testified about the legislative 
acts in question before a grand jury.59 This question of waiver is tied 
to the constitutional propriety of executive-branch investigations and 
prosecutions of Members: if Congress can waive its Members’ 
privileges, then perhaps only congressional approval is required 
before the executive branch investigates a Member using techniques 
that expose it to legislative-act materials. 
 
local Stannary Court in 1512 of obstructing tin mining. PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 248–49. 
The act annulling Strode’s conviction, Strode’s Act, 1512, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8, reprinted in 3 THE 
STATUTES OF THE REALM 53 (photo. reprint 1963) (London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1817), was 
understood in 1512 to vindicate only the freedom of parliamentary speech from interference 
from local tribunals, not to stand for any general principle of legislative privilege, PLUCKNETT, 
supra note 54, at 249.  
  As noted elsewhere, this difference in the understanding of the origin of the privilege 
has practical significance. See Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 470 (noting this conflict of 
interpretation among commentators and that “[t]he dispute is not academic”). An ancient 
judicial privilege might be discounted as a contingent peculiarity of English constitutional 
history. Indeed, perpetuation of the Brewster Court’s flawed analysis in this regard has the 
potential to affect the analysis of those commentators who would “weigh” or “balance” the 
respective interests of the three branches of government by reference to the differing British 
and American compositions of government. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 9, at 410–12 (relying 
on the Brewster Court’s analysis to discount “the English understanding of its legislative speech 
protection”). Recognition that the privilege reflects democratic representation, rather than 
judicial origins, precludes such summary distinction from the English legislative experience; the 
American legislative experience, too, is one characterized by democratic representation. 
 56. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524–25.  
 57. Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It appears that the first time the government 
presented the argument ultimately adopted by the Court was in its Supplemental Memorandum 
on Reargument. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 221 n.144. 
 58. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979). 
 59. See id. at 490–92. In Helstoski, the Court stated that waiver by a Member would require 
“explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the [Clause’s] protection.” Id. at 491.  
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C. The Oversight Cases 
Prosecutions of Members of Congress also resulted in a series of 
cases in which the Court defined the extent to which the Clause 
protects Congress’s oversight function. These oversight cases are 
significant in two regards. First, the Rayburn majority relied on the 
Court’s holding in Gravel v. United States60 that the Clause 
encompassed a testimonial privilege.61 Second, the oversight cases 
secured congressional oversight as existing within the bounds of the 
Clause’s core protected activities, thus providing protective space for 
congressional investigations.62 
In Gravel v. United States and later cases—Doe v. McMillan63 and 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire64—the Court distinguished between 
Congress’s claimed informing function and Congress’s oversight 
function. The Court held in these cases that although the Clause 
protects Members acting pursuant to the oversight function (including 
Senator Mike Gravel’s reading the Pentagon Papers into the 
Congressional Record65), it does not protect the publication of 
classified materials to the public,66 defamatory comments in 
constituent mailings,67 or the public distribution of congressional 
reports.68 These “informing” activities are “political,” as they are not 
part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the 
legislative process.69 The basis for this distinction was the Court’s 
distinction in Brewster between “purely legislative activities,” which 
 
 60. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
 61. See id. at 616 (“We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer—
either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution—for the events 
that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.”).  
 62.  Others have written about the constitutional values promoted by vigorous 
congressional oversight; values including Congress’s very ability to legislate. See generally, e.g., 
Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915; 
Ervin, supra note 52.  
 63. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1972). 
 64. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
 65. The Gravel prosecution resulted from Senator Gravel’s reading the Pentagon Papers 
into the Congressional Record during a hastily convened meeting of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Public Buildings and Grounds and his alleged arrangement for their publication by Beacon 
Press. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609. His efforts received relatively little attention due to the Supreme 
Court’s decision the next day in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), 
protecting the New York Times’s publication of the Pentagon Papers. 
 66. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626. 
 67. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132, 136. 
 68. Doe, 412 U.S. at 324–25. 
 69. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132–33. 
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the Clause protects, and “legitimate ‘errands’ performed for 
constituents,” which it termed “political in nature rather than 
legislative.”70 Congressional oversight of executive-branch agencies is 
important to democratic representation, particularly in the face of 
both expanding executive-branch power71 and the executive branch’s 
increasing overclassification of information.72 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: RAYBURN AND RENZI 
Rayburn and Renzi produced a split in authority among the 
federal courts of appeal as to whether the Clause protects Members 
 
 70. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). Harvey A. Silverglate, who 
represented Senator Gravel in the Pentagon Papers litigation, and Professor Robert J. Reinstein 
sharply criticize this aspect of the Court’s analysis, arguing that the Clause’s protections must 
extend to a range of activities that reflects modern understandings of political representation, 
rather than the static understanding at the time of the Clause’s adoption. See generally Reinstein 
& Silverglate, supra note 16. Similarly, Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., wrote that the Court’s labeling 
“political” activities “‘errands’ and assuming that they are performed for base political 
reasons . . . demeans many legitimate acts performed by Congressmen in their representative 
capacities.” See Ervin, supra note 52, at 186. 
 71. E.g., Reckless Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the 
Constitution?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 32–33 (2006) 
[hereinafter Reckless Justice] (statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor, George Washington 
University Law School).  
 72. Justice Douglas discussed this concern regarding overclassification in his Gravel 
dissent: 
The secrecy of documents in the Executive Department has been a bone of 
contention between it and Congress from the beginning. . . . [A]s has been revealed 
by such exposés as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin 
“incident,” and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Government usually suppresses 
damaging news but highlights favorable news. In this filtering process the secrecy 
stamp is the officials’ tool of suppression and it has been used to withhold information 
which in “99½%” of the cases would present no danger to national security.  
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 637, 641–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Many would argue that control over 
and access to information has contributed to the expansion of executive-branch power. See, e.g., 
Ervin, supra note 52, at 191 (“Viewed in the context of the increasing difficulty that Congress 
has in getting necessary information from the administration, [Gravel and Brewster] not only 
limit the effective functioning of the legislative branch, but further increase the dominance of 
the executive.” (footnote omitted)); see also Reckless Justice, supra note 71, at 32–33 
(documenting the expansion of executive-branch power in the early 2000s); cf. ELIZABETH 
GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING 
OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2011) (“Overclassification is a 
perennial problem, and one that causes serious harm.”). 
  A possible counterargument to the possibility of impeding the oversight function is 
simply that courts can cross that bridge when they reach it. Cf., e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. 
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power to tax is 
not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”). Impeding the oversight function, however, is 
not a mere possibility: the bridge is arguably in the rearview mirror and fading fast. See infra 
notes 223–24 and accompanying text. See generally Clark, supra note 62. 
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from the executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of legislative-
act material; that is, whether the Clause encompasses a 
“nondisclosure privilege.” This Part outlines the facts of each case 
and discusses how the D.C. and Ninth Circuits addressed whether the 
Clause encompasses a “nondisclosure privilege.”  
A. Congressman William Jefferson 
1. The Facts in Rayburn.  In March 2005, the FBI began 
investigating Congressman William Jefferson, a nine-term 
representative from Louisiana’s Second District, for bribery.73 
Jefferson, who served as the cochair of the Africa Trade and 
Investment Caucus and the Congressional Caucus on Nigeria, was 
suspected of both promising to undertake official acts on behalf of 
business interests in the United States, Nigeria, and Ghana, and of 
conspiring to bribe foreign officials.74 In a much-publicized aspect of 
the investigation, a jilted investor-turned-informant approached 
Jefferson wearing a wire and solicited his assistance in bribing a 
Nigerian official with $100,000 cash, which Jefferson accepted and 
placed in the trunk of his car.75 Days later, FBI agents raided 
Jefferson’s car76 and his house in Washington, D.C., where they found 
$90,000 in his freezer.77 
One notable detail in this initial search was the role played by 
the House Office of General Counsel (House Counsel) in securing 
Congressman Jefferson’s car, which the search warrant had indicated 
would be parked at the Congressman’s house.78 When the FBI 
determined that the vehicle was located in the garage of the Rayburn 
House Office Building—within the Capitol Hill complex—FBI agents 
 
 73. United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 74. Id. at 335–36, 340. 
 75. E.g., Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed Taking Cash, WASH. POST., May 22, 
2006, at A1. 
 76. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the 
U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae at 4, In re Search of the Rayburn House 
Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C 2006) (N. 06-231 M-01).  
 77. Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault at 10, In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 
432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (N. 06-23 M-01), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/may/sw 
_redacted.pdf. Ironically, while Jefferson and the informant passed notes back and forth to one 
another over a dinner during which Jefferson solicited a kickback, he commented, “All these 
damn notes we’re writing to each other as if we’re talking, as if the FBI is watching.” Id. at 21. 
 78. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, supra 
note 76, at 4. 
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and Capitol Police officers jointly secured the vehicle.79 The Capitol 
Police notified House Counsel through the House Sergeant at Arms, 
who then notified Jefferson, who ultimately cooperated with the 
search.80 
On the same day as the raid, a grand jury issued a subpoena 
duces tecum for documents in Congressman Jefferson’s office in the 
Rayburn House Office Building.81 After Jefferson took steps to 
preserve documents potentially responsive to the subpoena,82 House 
Counsel arranged to secure those documents with Jefferson’s staff.83 
Six months later, as an appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit from the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia’s sealed ruling on Jefferson’s challenge to the subpoena,84 
the FBI applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia for 
a search warrant for Jefferson’s Rayburn office.85 The affidavit in 
support of the search warrant described special procedures designed 
to safeguard materials protected by the Speech or Debate Clause:86 
most importantly, agents with no substantive role in the Jefferson 
investigation were to conduct the physical search, after which a 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 4–5; see also 151 CONG. REC. 15, 20,448 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jefferson) 
(notifying the House of his being served with a subpoena). For a discussion of the requirements 
of Rule VIII of the House, which requires these announcements, see infra notes 188–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group, 
supra note 76, at 5. 
 83. Id. The documents were locked in a drawer in the office of Jefferson’s Chief of Staff, 
while emails were preserved by the office of the Chief Administrative Officer. Letter from Mark 
D. Lytle, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to David Plotinsky, U.S. House of Representatives Assistant 
Counsel, “Grand Jury Investigation 05GJ1318” (Sept. 16, 2005). That Jefferson’s Chief of Staff 
controlled the items could be legally relevant, as such an arrangement would avoid a situation in 
which the act of Jefferson’s compelled production would have testimonial significance. See 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 28 (2000). Yet, even if Jefferson himself controlled the 
documents, to the extent that his control would have been in a custodial capacity, he almost 
certainly would not have had a Fifth Amendment claim in the absence of an overbroad or 
indefinite request. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988); cf. United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–46 (2000) (affirming dismissal of an indictment on Fifth Amendment 
grounds in the face of an overbroad subpoena because the defendant’s act of production had a 
testimonial aspect). 
 84. This process, which took place under seal, would have occurred ex parte, but was 
reported to the Washington Post under condition of anonymity. Shailagh Murray & Allan 
Lengel, Return of Jefferson Files Is Sought, WASH. POST, May 25, 2006, at A1. 
 85. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault, supra note 77, at 72. 
 86. Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault, supra note 77, at 74–82. 
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“Filter Team” would review the files for responsiveness to the 
warrant and “determine if they may fall within the purview of the 
Speech or Debate Clause privilege.”87 
The District Court for the District of Columbia found probable 
cause for the search warrant, directing the warrant to be executed 
within three days and the U.S. Capitol Police to “provide immediate 
access” to Congressman Jefferson’s office.88 The search occurred on 
Saturday, May 20, 2006, and lasted eighteen hours, during which time 
the FBI excluded from the office Jefferson’s personal counsel, House 
Counsel,89 and the Capitol Police.90 Jefferson challenged the 
constitutionality of the search warrant four days later, claiming that 
the issuance and execution of the search warrant violated the Speech 
or Debate Clause.91 The district court denied this motion,92 as well as 
the Congressman’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal.93 
The D.C. Circuit immediately reversed the latter denial, requiring in 
a remand order94 that the district court provide copies of the seized 
materials to the Congressman, hear his privilege submissions ex parte, 
 
 87. Id. at 76. The noncase agents would also image the Congressman’s computer. Id. at 73–
74. The Filter Team was comprised of an Assistant U.S. Attorney, an attorney from the 
Department of Justice, and a non-case agent from the FBI. Id. at 75–76. It was to provide a log 
of “potentially privileged paper records” and a copy of the records to Jefferson’s counsel, 
forwarding the originals to the district court for a determination of privilege; it was then to 
return copies of the paper records it determined were nonprivileged to the Congressman while 
forwarding the original paper records to the prosecution team. Id. at 77–78. The computer 
image was to be forensically processed by the FBI using approved search terms, the results of 
which would be reviewed by the Filter Team using the same procedure as for the paper files. Id. 
at 76–82. This digital aspect of the search deserves commentary by someone with greater 
technical expertise than I, and is thus outside the scope of this Note. 
 88. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657.  
 89. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 
2006), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  
 90. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group, 
supra note 76, at 7.  
 91. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657. Jefferson filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(g) for the return of his property and an injunction against review of the seized 
materials. Id. President George W. Bush immediately “directed the Attorney General, acting 
through the Solicitor General, to preserve and seal the records” until July 9, 2006. Id. 
 92. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
 93. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 658.  
 94. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., No. 06-3105 (D.C. Cir., July 28, 2006) 
(remand order). 
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and determine in camera which materials were “legislative in 
nature.”95 
2. Congressman William Jefferson in the D.C. Circuit.  Ruling 
over a year after its interim remand order, the D.C. Circuit in United 
States v. Rayburn House Office Building held that “the compelled 
disclosure of privileged material to the Executive during execution of 
the search warrant . . . violated the Speech or Debate clause.”96 The 
search constituted “compelled disclosure” because it necessarily 
involved and contemplated the executive branch’s exposure to 
legislative materials, as “FBI agents had to review all of the papers in 
the Congressman’s office.”97 
The majority reasoned that under D.C. Circuit precedent in 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,98 the Clause’s 
testimonial privilege extends to protect written legislative-act 
materials absolutely, and that this privilege includes a protection from 
compelled disclosure.99 Accordingly, the search was unconstitutional 
because it “denied the Congressman any opportunity to identify and 
assert the privilege with respect to legislative materials before their 
compelled disclosure to Executive agents.”100 The court denied 
Jefferson’s requested recovery and—in an aspect of the case that is 
easy to overlook but of central importance to understanding its 
holding—it left its interim remand order in place,101 opining that the 
appropriate accommodation of both the Speech or Debate protection 
and the executive branch’s enforcement interests are “best 
determined by the legislative and executive branches in the first 
instance.”102 
 
 95. Id. Following oral argument in this interlocutory proceeding in the D.C. Circuit, a 
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a sixteen-count indictment against 
Jefferson. Indictment, United States v. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 
1:07cr209), 2007 WL 1686486. 
 96. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656. It also held that “the Congressman [was] entitled to the 
return of documents that the [district] court determine[d] to be privileged under the Clause.” Id.  
 97. Id. at 661. 
 98. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 99. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“As ‘discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive’ as 
naming Members or their staffs as parties to a suit . . . ‘a party is no more entitled to compel 
congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen . . . .’” 
(alterations and citations omitted)); see also infra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 100. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662. 
 101. Id. at 663. For a description of the order, see supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 102. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663. 
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Judge Henderson, concurring solely in the judgment,103 
challenged the majority’s reliance on Brown & Williamson, which had 
upheld two Members’ challenge to a civil subpoena obtained by 
private parties who sought files in possession of a congressional 
subcommittee.104 She opined that Brown & Williamson had included 
an internal constraint that “the Clause’s ‘testimonial privilege might 
be less stringently applied when inconsistent with a sovereign 
interest,’ such as the conduct of criminal proceedings.”105 Emphasizing 
in a footnote that Congressman Jefferson had invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right against responding to the earlier subpoena,106 she 
reasoned that unlike a subpoena, the execution of a search warrant is 
not unconstitutional “question[ing]” protected by the Clause because 
it requires no affirmative response.107 In her view, “[T]o conclude that 
the Clause’s shield protects against any Executive Branch exposure to 
records of legislative acts would jeopardize law enforcement tools 
that have never been considered problematic.”108 
B. Congressman Rick Renzi 
1. The Facts in Renzi.  Congressman Rick Renzi of Arizona 
served on the House Natural Resources Committee, “the committee 
responsible for, among other things, approving of any land-exchange 
legislation before it can reach the floor of the House.”109 Ostensibly in 
connection with this committee service, Renzi twice sought to induce 
private parties seeking land-exchange deals to purchase property 
 
 103. Judge Henderson agreed with the majority’s judgment affirming the district court’s 
denial of Congressman Jefferson’s Rule 41(g) motion, but she did “not agree with the majority’s 
reasoning,” and sought to distance herself from what she considered to be its dicta. Id. at 667 
(Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 104. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421–23 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 105. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brown 
& Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419–20). Judge Henderson noted that the internal constraint in Brown 
& Williamson was consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation in Gravel that “the Clause 
‘does not purport to confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress’ from criminal 
process.” Id. at 668 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972)). 
 106. Id. at 668 n.7; cf. supra note 83. 
 107. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 669 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1). 
 108. Id. at 671 (quotation marks omitted); see also In re Search of the Rayburn House Office 
Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument 
would require a Member . . . to be given advance notice of any search of his property . . . and 
further that he be allowed to remove any material he deemed to be covered by the legislative 
privilege prior to a search.”). 
 109. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted). “Federal 
land exchanges involve the exchange of privately held land for federal land.” Id. at 1016 n.4. 
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owned by Renzi’s former business partner, James Sandlin, who owed 
the Congressman money.110 At one point Renzi allegedly stated in 
soliciting a bribe, “no Sandlin property, no bill.”111 Despite his alleged 
promises, Renzi never introduced the land-exchange bill.112 
The government’s investigation of Congressman Renzi presented 
multiple means of possible exposure to legislative-act materials: “[I]t 
interviewed Congressman Renzi’s aides, reviewed documents 
provided by those aides [without the Congressman’s consent], 
wiretapped Congressman Renzi’s personal cell phone in accordance 
with a Title III order, and searched, pursuant to a warrant, the office 
of Patriot Insurance,” where the payments were made to Renzi.113 A 
grand jury returned an indictment against Renzi charging “[forty-
eight] criminal counts related to his land exchange ‘negotiations,’ 
including public corruption, charges of extortion, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.”114 
2. Congressman Rick Renzi in the Ninth Circuit.  In United States 
v. Renzi, the Ninth Circuit considered, among other things, whether 
the “district court erred by refusing to hold a Kastigar-like hearing” 
regarding the government’s exposure to and reliance upon legislative-
act materials in obtaining indictments.115 Congressman Renzi’s appeal 
on the issue, to be successful, would have required two conceptual 
steps: First, it would have required the court to recognize an absolute 
“nondisclosure privilege,” as the D.C. Circuit had in Rayburn, such 
that the executive branch’s exposure to legislative-act materials would 
constitute a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause.116 Second, it 
would have required this “grandiose, yet apparently shy, privilege of 
 
 110. Id. at 1016–17. 
 111. Id. at 1030. The first time he simply offered to introduce the bill, whereas the second 
time—“following the collapse of ‘negotiations’ with [the first party]”—he also offered the 
second private party a “free pass” for the bill through the Committee. Id. at 1017. The second 
party made a $1 million deposit to Sandlin, who used the money to pay his outstanding debts to 
Renzi. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1018. 
 113. See id. at 1017, 1018 n.6.  
 114. Id. at 1018 & n.7. 
 115. Id. at 1032. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held 
that the government may compel an individual’s testimony over a Fifth Amendment claim upon 
granting use and derivative-use immunity. Id. at 462. At a so-called “Kastigar hearing,” the 
government must prove that its case does not rely upon any evidence derived from the prior 
compelled testimony. See Fifth Amendment at Trial, 38 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 616, 632 & 
n.1923 (2009). 
 116. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1033.  
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non-disclosure that the Supreme Court has not thought fit to 
recognize” to “preclude[] even the use of derivative evidence.”117 
The Ninth Circuit sided with Judge Henderson’s concurring 
opinion in Rayburn, “disagree[ing] with both Rayburn’s premise and 
its effect and thus declin[ing] to adopt its rationale.”118 It concluded 
that “the Clause does not incorporate a non-disclosure privilege as to 
any branch,”119 excoriating what it stated was the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning that “distraction alone serves as the touchstone for the 
absolute protection of the Clause.”120 The court concluded that the 
D.C. Circuit’s precedent—based on the protection of legislators from 
“the burden of defending themselves”121—conflicted with cases in 
which the Supreme Court allowed exposure to legislative acts.122 
Despite explaining at great length its disagreement with the D.C. 
Circuit as to the scope of the Clause, the Ninth Circuit disposed of the 
case by holding that although some legislative-act evidence was 
improperly presented to the grand jury, it did not cause the grand jury 
to indict; rather, non-legislative-act evidence of bribed promises 
caused the indictment.123 
 
 117. Id. at 1032 & n.21. Note the alternative not taken: the court could have rested its 
analysis having concluded that even if the Clause did encompass a “nondisclosure privilege,” it 
would not preclude the derivative use of evidence obtained in violation thereof. See infra note 
123; cf., e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (outlining avoidance principles). 
 118. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034; see id. at 1037 n.28 (agreeing that the execution of a search 
warrant “falls far short of the ‘question[ing]’ required to trigger the Clause” (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment)) (quotation marks omitted)).  
 119. Id. at 1039. 
 120. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 1035 (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (per curiam)). 
 122. See id. at 1034, 1036–39. The Ninth Circuit zeroed in on the Rayburn court’s 
“distraction” rationale by noting that it provided the only basis for the preclusion of civil 
discovery in Brown & Williamson. Id. at 1034 (citing Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d 408, 418, 421 
(D.C. Cir. 1995); MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 
1988)). It reasoned that this aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s precedent extended the holding in 
Eastland too far and that civil discovery is precluded only when the underlying civil action is 
itself precluded. As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was unnecessary distraction, rather 
than distraction alone, that was precluded in Eastland. Id. at 1034–35. For criticism of this aspect 
of the court’s holding, see infra notes 153–54, 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 123. Id. at 1031. The circuit split identified here largely concerns dicta. See supra note 117. 
Accordingly, Renzi would not necessarily have come out differently on the analysis discussed in 
Parts III and IV of this Note. The Ninth Circuit was probably right in implying that the Speech 
or Debate Clause does not confer derivative-use immunity. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032 n.21. 
The Supreme Court has treated the Clause more like the Fourth Amendment than the Fifth 
Amendment. It has applied the Clause’s evidentiary protection as a fairly narrow exclusionary 
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* * * 
Having discussed the Supreme Court’s Speech or Debate Clause 
cases and the D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ opinions regarding whether 
the Clause encompasses a “nondisclosure privilege,” this Note now 
recasts Rayburn through separation-of-powers analysis, which will 
underscore the limited nature of Rayburn’s holding and will situate 
the case within the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence. 
III.  NONDISCLOSURE AS SEPARATION OF POWERS: A FORMALIST 
READING 
In deciding Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit faced a narrow question: 
Does the executive branch or does Congress get to make a first 
determination as to the applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
given that the executive branch has a law-enforcement interest in the 
materials to be seized?124 This question is readily framed as one which 
formalist separation-of-powers analysis can answer:125 Is one branch 
exercising a power it does not have the authority to exercise?126 
This Part’s contribution to Speech or Debate Clause scholarship 
is methodological. It analyzes the separation-of-powers claim without 
 
rule, permitting prosecutions following the exclusion of any offending evidence, see supra Part I, 
rather than requiring the government to meet anything comparable to the Fifth Amendment 
Kastigar burden to avoid the exclusion of evidence. Cf. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 
516 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Determining whether evidence is tainted as the fruit of an unconstitutional 
search or seizure or whether the taint is attenuated presents many of the same problems as 
deciding whether the evidence used against [a defendant] is derived from . . . prior immunized 
testimony. However, the two situations are distinguishable . . . . [I]t serves little deterrent 
purpose to exclude evidence which is only indirectly and by an attenuated chain of causation the 
product of improper police conduct.” (citations omitted)). 
 124. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“The Executive acknowledges, in connection with the execution of a search warrant, that there 
is a role for a Member of Congress to play in exercising the Member’s rights under the Speech 
or Debate Clause. The parties disagree on precisely when that should occur and what effect any 
violation of the Member’s Speech or Debate rights should have. The Congressman contends that 
the exercise of his privilege under the Clause must precede the disclosure of the contents of his 
congressional office to agents of the Executive . . . .” (emphasis added)). For a description of the 
search procedure in Rayburn, see supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. The executive 
branch’s competing interest is its duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 125. See supra note 30. 
 126. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (finding unconstitutional the 
Article I Comptroller General’s exercising Article II powers); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76, 88 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (finding 
unconstitutional an Article I court’s exercising Article III powers). 
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falling back upon any “freestanding separation of powers principle.”127 
Instead, in considering whether the executive branch has the 
authority to make the first determination as to the applicability of the 
Speech or Debate Clause, this Part looks to the text of the Speech or 
Debate Clause, judicial precedent construing the Clause, and past 
interbranch practice. This methodology provides analytical content to 
a claim that a Speech or Debate Clause case violates (or does not 
violate) the separation of powers—or at least more analytical content 
than simply claiming that any interbranch exercise of power violates 
the separation of powers, or invoking the appropriate “balance of 
powers.”128 Without concluding that Members have an absolute 
“nondisclosure privilege,” this Part concludes that the Clause affords 
Congress a right of prior assertion—that is, the right to assert its 
institutional interests prior to the compelled disclosure of legislative-
act material. 
A. The Text 
Turning first to the text,129 the only part of the Clause that might 
on its face encompass a Member’s and/or Congress’s right to assert 
legislative privilege prior to compelled disclosure is the Clause’s 
prohibition on “question[ing].” Used as a verb in 1787, “to question” 
had several possible meanings, including (1) “to enquire,” (2) “to 
debate by interrogatories,” (3) “to examine one by questions,” (4) “to 
doubt; to be uncertain of,” and (5) “to have no confidence in; to 
mention as not to be trusted.”130 Definitions four and five do not fit 
the Speech or Debate Clause, as Senators and Representatives would 
not themselves be doubted “for any Speech or Debate in either 
House;” and it is equally untenable to suggest that the Framers 
constitutionalized a prohibition against the public’s losing trust or 
confidence in their representatives. The other definitions have 
 
 127. See generally Manning, supra note 20. For a brief summary of Professor Manning’s 
article, see infra Part IV.A. 
 128. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
 129. For ease of reference, the text of Article I, Section 6 is reprinted here:  
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to 
be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall 
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going 
to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place. 
 130. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1778).  
CARROLL IN PP CLEAN VERSION (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:51 AM 
1176 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1153 
functionally identical meanings—the same dictionary defines 
“interrogatory” as “a question; an enquiry.”131 Together, these 
definitions roughly approximate the following definition: “to examine 
by interrogation.”132 Although this definition fits within the Speech or 
Debate Clause framework, it does not identify the point in an 
investigation at which this protection against examination by 
interrogation first applies—that is, whether it applies at the point of 
disclosure to investigators or whether it only applies at trial. Thus, the 
plain meaning of the text does not reveal whether, during an 
investigation, executive-branch officials may make the first 
determination as to whether the Clause’s protection attaches. 
The legal meaning in 1787 of the formulation “shall not be 
questioned” is not particularly illuminating either.133 Most examples of 
contemporaneous legal usage are inapplicable—for instance, 
prohibitions on the questioning of legal instruments134 or the right to 
bear arms.135 Other examples fail to resolve whether a prohibition on 
questioning is solely a trial protection: Aside from Coffin v. Coffin, 
which construed the Massachusetts analogue to the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause,136 state courts used the formulation “shall not be 
questioned” in reference to natural persons in two circumstances. 
First, in Commonwealth v. Myers,137 the General Court of Virginia 
construed a statute that read, 
That if any person charged with any crime or offence against the 
commonwealth shall be acquitted or discharged from further 
 
 131. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 130. 
 132. By comparison, the Supreme Court in Helstoski indicated that questioning has a 
broader meaning than offering, and implied that the textual hook—the prohibition on 
“question[ing]”—is triggered any time information about a legislative act is revealed. United 
States v. Helstoski, 422 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1979). 
 133. See Harrell, supra note 9, at 396–97 (discussing contemporaneous usage and concluding 
that “[t]hese usages fail to illuminate the Speech or Debate Clause’s original meaning”). 
 134. Several state cases employed the phrase “shall not be questioned” in reference to “the 
validity of prizes,” Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 11 (1794), “legal title,” M’Nitt v. 
Logan, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) 60, 69 (1808), and the decisions of “a court of competent 
jurisdiction in one nation . . . in the court of another,” Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220, 250 (Pa. 
1810). 
 135. See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23 (1792), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 33, at 
1275 (“[T]he right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not 
be questioned.”); PENN. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 33, at 
3101 (“[T]he right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves and the State, shall not be 
questioned.”).  
 136. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 137. Commonwealth v. Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 188 (1811). 
CARROLL IN PP CLEAN VERSION (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:51 AM 
2014]  CONGRESS’S SPEECH OR DEBATE PROTECTION 1177 
prosecution by the court of the county or corporation in which the 
offence is or may by law be examinable, he or she shall not 
thereafter be examined, questioned or tried for the same crime or 
offence, but may plead such acquittal or discharge in bar of any 
other or further examination or trial for the same crime or offence, 
any law, custom, usage or opinion to the contrary in any wise 
notwithstanding.138 
The wording of this statute indicates that questioning was not 
solely a trial protection, as its use of the word “questioned” in a series 
including “examined” and “tried” suggests that these words had 
different meanings.139 Moreover, the Myers court referred in several 
instances to “the examining court,”140 suggesting that “examination” 
contemplates official judicial process. Thus, the court’s 
pronouncement that “if his examining court discharges him, he can 
never afterwards be questioned for the same crime”141 specifically 
indicates that questioning would happen at an earlier procedural 
posture in an investigation than would any official, in-court 
examination. 
Second, another series of cases stands for the principle that “[a] 
judge shall not be questioned in a civil suit for doing, or neglecting, or 
refusing, to do a particular official act, in the exercise of judicial 
power.”142 The most illuminating of these cases is Yates v. Lansig,143 
which examined the concept of judicial immunity in some depth, and 
concluded that the scienter of a judge undertaking judicial activities 
“can never be averred or shown, but under process of 
impeachment.”144 Yates is analogous to United States v. Johnson in 
that it held that judges could not be responsible for—nor could 
 
 138. Act of Jan. 24, 1804, ch. 95, § 3, in 3 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 75 (Richmond, 
Samuel Shepard 1836) (emphases added). 
 139. Cf. Chapman v. Turner, 5 Va. (1 Call.) 280, 287 (1798) (“It is an universal rule of 
interpretation, that that construction shall be preferred which will reconcile and give effect to 
the whole instrument without rejecting any part.”). 
 140. E.g., Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 236. 
 141. Id. at 245 (emphases added). 
 142. Armstrong v. Campbell, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 259, 260 n.1 (1808); see Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 
315, 329 (Conn. 1804) (holding that “a judge is not to be questioned in a civil suit” “for error of 
judgment, in doing an act . . . in the exercise of judicial power”); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 
297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (ruling in favor of a chancery judge who, acting in his official capacity, 
was alleged to have committed trespass in recommitting an individual to prison who had been 
discharged upon habeas corpus, because judges neither were nor could “be responsible in civil 
suit”). 
 143. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
 144. Id. at 298. 
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judicial inquiry be had into the motives for—actions undertaken in 
the course of a judge’s judicial duties.145 It does not foreclose a 
meaning of “to question” that encompassed pretrial protections. 
Thus, contemporaneous legal usage does not speak to the meaning of 
the word “question” in a way that resolves whether the legal meaning 
of the verb “to question” encompassed a right to assert legislative 
privilege prior to compelled disclosure during an investigation. 
Nor do inferences from other parts of the Constitution help. The 
formulation “shall not be questioned” also appears in the Fourteenth 
Amendment,146 which was not ratified until 1868, and which denotes a 
clearly inapplicable meaning of “treating a particular legal issue as 
settled.”147 Although it is tempting to infer from the Clause’s 
placement within Article I, rather than Article II, that it must be 
within Congress’s sole function to make a first determination of 
privilege, such reasoning fails to resolve the question at hand; this 
structural inference speaks only to which branch the Clause protects, 
rather than whether the Clause protects against compelled disclosure. 
For the sake of argument, one might put aside the previous four 
paragraphs’ analysis and assume that compelled disclosure to 
investigators does not categorically fall within the Clause’s 
prohibition of “question[ing],” such that investigators may “question” 
Members. Even with this assumption in hand, the text of the Clause is 
unclear as to whether investigators from the executive branch—as 
opposed to legislative-branch officials—may question Senators and 
Representatives, or whether they may question them in the House. 
Put otherwise, whether questioning is permissible might depend on 
who is doing the questioning and where, geographically, they are 
doing it. The best possible argument proceeding from the assumption 
that investigatory questioning is permissible might seek to infer that 
the Clause’s prohibition on questioning Senators and Representatives 
“in any other Place” should be read in conjunction with the prefatory 
 
 145. For discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. The New 
York Supreme Court of Judicature indicated that judges could only be liable for actions taken 
“in a mere ministerial capacity,” as such acts are “not . . . judicial act[s].” Yates, 5 Johns. at 297. 
This reasoning is similar to the reasoning in Brewster, in which the Supreme Court held that 
taking a bribe is not a legislative act. See supra note 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4, cl. 1 (“The validity of the public debt of the United 
States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned.”). For mention of the inapplicability of 
similar state-constitution provisions, see supra note 134. 
 147. Harrell, supra note 9, at 396; see id. at 397 (noting that such usage “fails to illuminate 
the Speech or Debate Clause’s original meaning” because “the object of ‘shall not be 
questioned’ is a legal concept, not a natural person”). 
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clause’s “in either House,” leading to the conclusion that Senators 
and Representatives may be questioned in either House. This is not a 
necessary inference, however; the imperative phrase (“they shall not 
be questioned in any other Place”) could very well stand alone.148 But 
why did the Framers not write that “they shall not be questioned in 
any Place” or simply that “they shall not be questioned” and thereby 
avoid this confusion? A probable answer is that such phrasing would 
conflict with Article I, Section 6, Clause 2, which allows questioning 
of Senators and Representatives by each House—as opposed to 
questioning by executive-branch officials—in punishing and/or 
expelling its Members. 
In sum, the Clause does not, on its face, speak to whether it is 
constitutional for executive-branch officials to make a first 
determination during an investigation as to its protections. 
B. Precedent 
Judicial precedent also does not resolve whether executive-
branch officials may make the first determination during an 
investigation as to the Clause’s applicability. As expressed by the 
Court in United States v. Nixon,149 Congress and its Members do not 
have the exclusive right to determine the scope of their own 
privileges, as this would be inconsistent with judicial review.150 The 
Court has not, however, spoken explicitly to whether the legislative 
branch—rather than the executive branch—has the exclusive right to 
determine the applicability of the Speech or Debate protection in the 
first instance.151 
Whether the Supreme Court has implicitly held that non-
legislative officials may make first determinations as to the 
applicability of the Clause merely begs the question of the Clause’s 
scope. The Ninth Circuit reasoned in Renzi that the scope of the 
 
 148. Indeed, this is how the Court read the imperative phrase in Brewster, reasoning that in 
adopting the proclamation of Coffin v. Coffin that “[a Member] is entitled to this 
privilege . . . when not within the walls of the representatives’ chamber,” the Court in Tenney v. 
Brandhove had construed the Clause to protect “legislative acts . . . which take place outside the 
physical confines of the legislative chamber.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514–15 
(1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 28 (1808)). 
 149. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 150. See id. at 704 (“[T]his court has consistently exercised the power to construe and 
delineate claims arising under [the Speech or Debate Clause] . . . .”).  
 151. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that there was no Supreme Court case on point). 
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Clause could not include nondisclosure because the Supreme Court’s 
past actions are inconsistent with a “nondisclosure privilege.”152 It 
pointed to instances in which the Court required Members to turn 
over legislative-act material, concluding that the Clause prohibits only 
the introduction of legislative-act material at trial rather than the 
disclosure of these materials to investigators.153 Yet the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning is based on a flawed premise: namely, it assumes an 
inaccurate conception of the so-called “nondisclosure privilege.” If—
as this Note argues—the nondisclosure protection is solely Congress’s 
right to assert privilege prior to compelled disclosure, rather than a 
right of individual Members to do so, then contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s assertion, the Clause does not “blindly preclude disclosure 
and review by the Executive of documentary ‘legislative act’ 
evidence.”154 
In sum, judicial precedent does not resolve the constitutionality 
of executive-branch officials’ making a first determination of the 
Clause’s protections. 
C. Past Practice 
Unlike the text of the Clause and judicial precedent, past 
interbranch practice speaks directly to the question of whether 
executive-branch investigators may make the first determination as to 
the Clause’s applicability. Reference to past practice to interpret 
constitutional provisions can take the form of either reference to 
practice at the time the Constitution was framed or to historical 
gloss.155 This Section first refers to practice at the time the 
Constitution was framed, concluding that the Clause incorporates the 
institutional protection of its English antecedent, Article IX of the 
English Bill of Rights. It then considers historical gloss, which 
indicates that the Clause’s institutional protection is one of 
nondisclosure. 
1. Past Practice as Codification.  Questions of original meaning 
often boil down to whether the text codified or modified historical 
practice. In short, one might infer either that (1) the Speech or 
Debate Clause modified contemporary practice at the time of 
 
 152. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1037–39 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1037. 
 155. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). 
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ratification, or that (2) the Clause codified the ratifying generation’s 
background understanding of legislative privilege, an understanding 
informed by the English experience. In England, Parliament as an 
institution controlled the speech-and-debate privilege.156 The scope 
and understanding of the preratification parliamentary speech-and-
debate privilege are probative of the meaning of the Speech or 
Debate Clause—codifying this past understanding of institutional 
control of the privilege—in the absence of contradictory evidence 
from which to draw an inference of modification.157 At first glance, a 
textual comparison of the Clause to Article IX of the English Bill of 
Rights might appear to support a modifying inference, specifically in 
the Clause’s omission of the word “proceedings.”158 As this Section 
makes clear, however, the Framers’ intent of circumscribing 
parliamentary privilege generally is not probative of their excising 
from the English speech-and-debate privilege specifically its 
institutional protection of the legislative branch—in the form of 
nondisclosure—against the other branches. 
 
 156. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 23 
(Washington, Joseph Milligan & William Cooper 2d ed. 1812) (“The privilege of a member is 
the privilege of the House.” (citations omitted)); Bradley, supra note 38, at 223 (“The British 
courts have always maintained ‘that the privilege of Parliament is the privilege of Parliament as 
a whole and not the privilege in any individual member.’” (quoting Church of Scientology v. 
Johnson-Smith, [1972] 1 Q.B. 522, 528)); see also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED 
FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 5, 69–77 (2007) (characterizing the speech-and-debate privilege in England 
before and at the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted as “Blackstonian” and “geographical” 
in its protection of the institution of the House of Commons against outside interference); 
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 660 (“When the monarch attempted to intrude into the legislature, 
Parliament deployed its privilege as a shield; in times of more peaceful interbranch relations, the 
private protection dominated.”). 
 157. The Supreme Court has often engaged in the same interpretive exercise briefly 
undertaken here. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“The text of the 
Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation 
requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather, the right . . . is most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding.” (quotation mark omitted)); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 
U.S. 168, 189, 202 (1880) (finding Parliament’s exercise of its contempt power irrelevant to 
whether Congress possessed such power, as Congress “is in no sense a court,” but then 
interpreting with regard to the Speech or Debate Clause that “it may be reasonably inferred 
that the framers of the Constitution meant the same thing by the use of the language borrowed 
from” the English Bill of Rights). 
 158. Article IX reads: “That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in 
Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.” 
1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, § 9 (1689) (Eng.), reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 
55, at 143. For a discussion of the Framers’ omission of the word “proceedings,” see supra note 
38. 
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Article IX of the English Bill of Rights, which was adopted in the 
wake of the Glorious Revolution, did not incorporate a privilege 
unchanged since the early medieval period; rather, the privilege 
codified as Article IX reflected changing social and political 
circumstances.159 Without recounting the entire clash between 
parliamentary privilege and royal prerogative under the Tudors and 
Stuarts, it suffices to note here that the speech-and-debate privilege 
was of central importance to England’s realizing democratic 
representation.160 
In the century following the codification of the speech-and-
debate privilege as Article IX of the English Bill of Rights, Members 
 
 159. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1128–29. The account of legal historian 
Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett paints a comprehensive picture of the connection between 
parliamentary privilege and political power within a broader account of English constitutional 
history. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 54. To summarize: Parliament’s eventual 
assertion of the speech-and-debate privilege took place against the backdrop of, and 
contributed to, a four-century ascendancy of representative government. During these 
centuries, the House of Commons’s power and its role oscillated, as monarchs came to the 
throne with different understandings of royal prerogative concerning matters of political 
sensitivity—especially foreign affairs and religion. See generally id. 
 160. Professor Josh Chafetz advances this view in his book, Democracy’s Privileged Few. See 
generally CHAFETZ, supra note 156. 
  Two key aspects of the history of the privilege merit emphasis here. First, the clashes 
between privilege and prerogative overlapped substantively with the passing from the Crown to 
Parliament of the initiative for instituting legislation concerning matters of national importance. 
See PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 190 (noting the passing of the initiative from the government 
to the governed via their representatives). The fact of the popularly representative House of 
Commons initiating legislation would have been virtually incomprehensible to early English 
monarchs, who originally called upon the third estate for the limited purposes of securing taxes, 
loyalty during times of internal rebellion, and support for foreign conquest. See PLUCKNETT, 
supra note 54 at 129, 133, 140–41, 145. Cf. generally Neale, supra note 55 (documenting the shift 
from the practice of free speech under conditions of monarchical sufferance to the privilege of 
free speech as right). 
  Second, these clashes also overlapped with the House of Commons’s emerging 
understanding that its privileges were significant as a matter of political representation. See, e.g., 
SIMONDS D’EWES, THE JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN 
ELIZABETH 175 (London, Paul Bowes 1682) (“[H]e was not now a private man, but . . . person 
and place of a multitude specially chosen . . . .”); PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 313 (“This 
proceeding [the barring of William Strickland from attending Parliament in 1571] was noticed in 
the House as being in violation of parliamentary privilege, and an injury not merely to himself 
but to his constituents whom he represented.” (emphasis added)). This representation principle 
also appeared in the Apology of the Commons. A Form of Apology and Satisfaction To Be 
Delivered to His Majesty (1604), reprinted in J.R. TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF 
THE REIGN OF JAMES I 217–31 (1931) (“[O]ur privileges and liberties are our right and due 
inheritance no less than our very lands and goods . . . . [T]hey cannot be withheld from us, 
denied, or impaired, but with apparent wrong to the whole state of the realm.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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of Parliament abused other aspects of legislative privilege, most 
notably selling the benefits of their privilege from arrest and 
systemically accepting bribes.161 These abuses were demonstrably 
within the collective conscious of America’s founding generation.162 
Indeed, the colonists seized upon the 1763 prosecution for seditious 
libel of John Wilkes—by some accounts, the sole Member of 
Parliament who was not corrupt163—as evidence of the dangers of 
parliamentary overreach to democratic representation.164 
Many have taken the founding generation’s evident distrust of 
the legislative branch as reason to construe the Speech or Debate 
Clause narrowly.165 Yet the inclusion of the speech-and-debate 
privilege in the Constitution stands in stark contrast with the other 
privileges of Parliament, many of which—like the privilege from 
arrest, the contempt power, the privilege to determine Members’ 
qualifications, and the privileges of exclusion and expulsion—were 
either limited or excluded altogether.166 Indeed, that the privilege 
survived strengthens the inference that the Framers intended to 
narrow other privileges without changing the speech-and-debate 
privilege, as “none of the abuses discussed [during the Convention] 
was directly attributable to the free speech privilege, and none of the 
reservations expressed by the Framers was applicable to that 
privilege.”167 
 
 161. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 210 (noting the myriad abuses of parliamentary 
privilege). 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 546 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the prosecution of the English parliamentarian John Wilkes and noting that “the 
Framers, aware of these abuses, were determined to guard against them”). 
 163. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527–28 (1969) (discussing the prosecution of 
Wilkes and his subsequent campaign for reinstatement). 
 164. Bradley, supra note 38, at 221–22. 
 165. The ratifying generation undoubtedly aimed to guard against legislative excess. See 
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516–21 (construing the Clause narrowly by analogy to the privilege from 
arrest); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1, at 309 (“The legislative department is 
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.”); Bradley, supra note 38, at 211 (“[I]t is . . . clear that a rather narrow view of legislative 
privileges in general was the order of the day.”). For a discussion of the problems with this 
aspect of the Brewster Court’s analysis, see supra note 54. 
 166. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137. 
 167. Bradley, supra note 38, at 211; see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1139 
(“[T]he fact that the other legislative privileges were curtailed gives no warrant to dilute the 
speech or debate privilege, which had been molded by history as vital to the independence and 
integrity of the legislature. The argument to the contrary . . . expressed by Chief Justice Burger 
in Brewster[] depends upon an historical construction that is more creative than descriptive.”). 
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Two aspects of the American Clause’s text seem particularly 
problematic in the search for a textual hook for the preratification 
understanding of an institutional nondisclosure protection. The lesser 
problem is the Clause’s placement in Article I, Section 6, which lists 
the privileges of and restrictions upon Senators and Representatives, 
rather than in Article I, Section 5, which lists Congress’s institutional 
prerogatives and requirements. This placement is ultimately of no 
moment because Members only enjoy these privileges as Members of 
Congress. As Thomas Jefferson noted: “The privilege . . . is restrained 
to things done in the House in a Parliamentary course. For [the 
Member] is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to 
exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty.”168 
The bigger problem is the shift from Article IX’s absolute 
passive prohibition—that “Freedome of Speech and Debates or 
Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned”169—to the apparent vesting of this protection in “Senators 
and Representatives.”170 This change was made, without explanation, 
in the Committee of Style and Arrangement.171 Yet one can infer from 
a preliminary draft of the Clause that the specific limitation of 
legislative privileges in Article I, Section 6 to “Senators and 
Representatives” was directed at past abuses of the arrest privilege, 
rather than at the speech-and-debate privilege. That draft reads: 
Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the 
Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except 
treason[,] felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest 
during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning 
from it.172 
This earlier draft of the Clause was adopted by the Convention 
without contradiction.173 Notably, it leaves the speech-and-debate 
privilege as a passive prohibition, whereas it specifically vests the 
privilege from arrest in Senators and Representatives. Reading the 
 
 168. JEFFERSON, supra note 156, at 23–24 (citations omitted). 
 169. See supra note 158. 
 170. See supra note 9. 
 171. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1136 n.122.  
 172. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 171, at 180 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. 
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Committee on Style and Arrangement’s change of the Clause as a 
stylistic revision, rather than a substantive one, is consistent with the 
limits upon that Committee’s authority.174 It also makes sense given 
that parliamentary abuse of the arrest privilege involved its extension 
beyond Members.175 Of course this reasoning is speculative, as the 
only recorded debate on the Clause involved two proposals—one 
from Charles Pinckney and the other from James Madison—neither 
of which was adopted.176 As noted elsewhere, though, “The Supreme 
Court has relied expressly on this limitation on [the] authority [of the 
Committee on Style and Arrangement] when interpreting the text of 
the Constitution.”177 
* * * 
Given the absence of compelling contradictory evidence from 
which to draw an inference of modification, it seems that the Speech 
or Debate Clause is best thought of as codifying the institutional 
protection of its English antecedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
never recognized the privilege as vesting in legislators rather than in 
Congress,178 and the distinction between legislators’ and legislative 
privilege appears to have held salience with the founding 
 
 174. The Committee on Style and Arrangement lacked authority to substantively change the 
Constitution’s draft provisions. Id. at 553; Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 279, 288 (1998). 
 175. Members extended the arrest privilege to protect their property and servants and sold 
“protections” to “complete outsiders.” Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137 n.128; see 
supra notes 54, 161 and accompanying text. 
 176. Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 470.  
 177. Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other 
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1791, 1813 n.99 (1999) (citing U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8 (1995); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538–39 (1969)). 
 178. The Supreme Court stated in dicta in Gravel v. United States that the Speech or Debate 
Clause was the “privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or the aide on the 
Senator’s behalf,” but it did so in the course of considering whether the Clause’s protections 
extend to a Senator’s aide when the Senator would be protected by the Clause. Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972). Similarly out of context is the statement of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in Coffin v. Coffin: 
[I]t appears . . . that the privilege secured by [the Massachusetts Constitution’s speech 
or debate provision] is not so much the privilege of the house . . . as of each individual 
member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will 
of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house, but 
derives it from the will of the people . . . . 
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass 1, 19 (1808). Professor Craig Bradley notes that Coffin is “an 
ambiguous precedent at best,” Bradley, supra note 38, at 223 n.156, and the Supreme Court has 
never adopted this language from Coffin in construing the federal Speech or Debate Clause. 
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generation.179 Moreover, the Clause was written at a level of 
generality that allowed for tailoring to the American experience.180 
The ensuing historical gloss evinced this tailoring in action. 
2. Past Practice as Historical Gloss.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly made reference to historical gloss in deciding separation-
of-powers cases.181 Independent of its potential relevance in ordinary 
questions of constitutional interpretation, the history of past 
accommodation between two branches has special significance in the 
separation-of-powers context as evidence of the two branches’ settled 
understanding of where a constitutional line lies.182 Reference to past 
practice indicates that “since the first service of a subpoena for 
documents by the executive branch on a House committee,” Congress 
has reserved the right to make an “initial determination of the Speech 
 
 179. For instance, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided, “That no man, or set of men, 
are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in 
consideration of public services . . . .” VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 4, reprinted in 7 
THORPE, supra note 33 at 3813. Similarly, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided, “No 
man . . . ha[s] any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges distinct 
from those of the community, than what rises from the consideration of services rendered to the 
public . . . .” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 33, at 1890. 
Though further consideration of colonial parliamentary practice is outside the scope of this 
Note, it is discussed in greater detail in Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the 
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2003). 
 180. Thus, the level of generality at which the Convention adopted the Clause—as with 
other generally worded clauses in the Constitution—reflects a compromise to defer certain 
constitutional questions to future generations. See Manning, supra note 20, at 1945 (“Like many 
bargained-for texts, the Constitution’s structural provisions . . . leave many important questions 
unanswered.”); cf. Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 471 (“The framers, by rejecting the proposals 
of Madison and Pinckney, chose to fashion a loosely defined privilege and to leave its 
construction to the courts, not Congress.”). This Note does not follow the assumption that the 
courts must define all aspects of the boundary between the executive and legislative branches. 
Cf. Manning, supra note 20, at 1974 (“[R]espect for legislative supremacy requires interpreters 
to hew closely to the level of generality at which Congress has spoken.”); H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 379 (1998) (“It 
is . . . the province and duty of the political departments, within their respective spheres, to say 
what the law of the Constitution is.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“Traditional ways of 
conducting government . . . give meaning to the Constitution.” (quotation mark omitted)); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the 
words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”). 
 182. See Youngstown, 342 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he way the 
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true 
nature.”). 
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or Debate privilege . . . subject to court review.”183 This history 
suggests that legislative independence is not coterminous with 
legislators’ independence—and it is the former, rather than the latter, 
that requires absolute protection. 
The executive branch did not first seek to compel the production 
of documents from Congress until 1876, when it sought documents 
from the Committee of the House of Representatives on 
Expenditures in the War Department relating to the Committee’s 
investigation of Secretary of War William Belknap for bribery.184 
Upon that Committee’s notification to the House that it had complied 
with the subpoena, the House, after a lengthy debate, resolved that 
such compliance absent its approval was in breach of the House’s 
privilege.185 Later that month, Members notified the House of their 
receipt of a grand jury summons, prior to seeking the House’s consent 
to comply with the summons.186 Thus developed the practice, 
acquiesced in by the executive branch for the next one hundred years, 
that “subpoenas for documents . . . or testimony . . . could be 
complied with only by permission of the House by passage of a 
resolution to that effect.”187 
The House modified this practice in 1977,188 clarifying its 
procedures three years later in a precursor resolution to Rule VIII of 
 
 183. Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, 
Legislative Attorneys, Cong. Research Serv., Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by 
Executive Branch Searches of Legislative Offices 13 (June 13, 2006), available at  
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/Jefferson%20GD%20Memo.pdf. Others have written on 
this subject at greater length. See generally, e.g., David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial 
Subpoenas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523 (1977) (concluding that the House’s 
institutional interest in approving requests for documents is only in protecting the original 
copies). 
 184. 3 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2661 (1907). 
 185. See id. (“Whereas the mandate of said Court is in breach of the privilege of this House: 
Resolved, that the said committee and the members thereof are hereby directed to disregard 
said mandate until the further order of this House.”). 
 186. Id. § 2662. This practice accorded with the House’s decision in 1846 not to grant 
Members a blanket permission to comply with subpoenas ad testificandum, but rather to grant 
permission to the Representative in the instant situation. Id. § 2660. 
 187. Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, supra 
note 183, at 13, 14–16  
 188. H.R. Res. 10, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 73 (1977) (enacted). This procedural 
modification did not change the House practice of making a first determination in applying its 
privilege. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, 
supra note 183, at 16–17.  
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the House.189 Rule VIII requires a Member to notify the Speaker of 
the House upon the receipt of a subpoena and the Speaker to lay such 
notification before the House.190 After this, 
the Member . . . shall determine whether the issuance of the judicial 
or administrative subpoena or judicial order . . . is a proper exercise 
of jurisdiction by the court, is material and relevant, and is consistent 
with the privileges and rights of the House. Such Member . . . shall 
notify the Speaker before seeking judicial determination of these 
matters.191 
As noted elsewhere, “The second notification . . . provides the 
institution the opportunity to adopt a resolution prohibiting the 
release of the documents or testimony to be taken.”192 Indeed, the 
Rule requires that a “Member . . . shall comply with the . . . 
subpoena” except as “otherwise ordered by the House,”193 a 
requirement that also contemplates the possibility of Congress 
adopting a resolution prohibiting disclosure. This understanding is 
not limited to Congress—the U.S. Attorney’s Manual also 
acknowledges the practice.194 
These changes initiated in 1977 corresponded with the shift from 
Congress’s representation in litigation by the Department of Justice 
to the development of House and Senate Counsels Offices in 1977195 
 
 189. H.R. Res. 722, 96th Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 25,777 (1980) (enacted). This resolution 
was adopted as Rule L of the House Rules, H.R. Res. 5, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REC. 98 (daily 
ed. Jan. 5 1981), which itself was subsequently recodified, H.R. Res. 5, 106th Cong., at 23 (1999), 
as Rule VIII of the House Rules. THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S 
MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 112-161, at 408 
(2013). 
 190. For an example of the pro forma notification the rule generates, see 151 CONG. REC. 
20,448 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jefferson). 
 191. WICKHAM, supra note 189, at 409 (emphasis added).  
 192. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, 
supra note 183, at 18.  
 193. WICKHAM, supra note 189, at 410 (emphasis added). 
 194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: TITLE 9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL § 2046 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02046.htm. For further documentation of the executive 
branch’s acquiescence in Congress’s maintenance of a right of prior assertion of privilege, see 
generally David Kaye, Congressional Papers and Judicial Subpoenas, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 57 
(1975). Professor David Kaye concludes that Congress has a valid claim of absolute privilege as 
to the production of its original papers. Id. at 76. 
 195. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of 
Representing in Court the Institutional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998) 
(documenting the shift to institutional representation in the House and Senate). 
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and the establishment of those offices in the following two years.196 In 
the preceding decade, Congress’s institutional interests frequently 
diverged from those of the executive branch, as the executive branch 
resisted with increasing frequency the investigative demands of 
congressional committees197 and prosecuted several Members of 
Congress.198 That Congress—in altering its procedures during a time 
when its institutional interests were at the forefront of its concerns—
explicitly reinforced its understanding of its prerogative to make the 
first determination of privilege lends additional support to such a 
right falling within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. When 
Congress takes specific action to guard its prerogatives, these actions 
have real, constitutional importance,199 especially given the executive 
branch’s continued acquiescence in that understanding—continued, 
that is, from the 1800s until 2006. 
* * * 
 
 196. Congress statutorily created the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, Ethics in 
Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 701, 92. Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978) (codified as amended at 
2 U.S.C. § 288–288n (2012)), whereas “[h]istorically, the functions of the House General 
Counsel were performed by the Counsel to the Clerk of the House,” whose position was 
“renamed House General Counsel in 1979,” MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVICE, RS22890, HOUSE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 1 (2008). For a discussion of the 
differences between the House and Senate Legal Counsel offices, see generally Tiefer, supra 
note 195. In particular, the offices differ in their approaches to criminal matters. Id. at 59–60. 
The statutory authorization of the Office of Senate Counsel provides only for the Office’s 
representation of Senators in civil actions. 2 U.S.C. § 288c (2012). The Senate office, however, 
may appear (and has appeared) “in criminal matters by representing document custodians and 
staff witnesses, or by representing the institution or its leadership as amici.” Tiefer, supra note 
195, at 59 n.60; see also S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4301 
(“[T]he Counsel may be directed to defend [Senators] if the case is civil or criminal in nature 
but only if the subpoena arises from the performance of official duties.”). The office has 
appeared as amicus in support of at least one Senator’s defense of a criminal matter. Tiefer, 
supra note 195, at 60 n.65 (citing United States v. Durenberger, No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477 
(D. Minn. Dec. 3, 1993)). House Counsel has generally been much more willing to represent the 
House’s institutional interests in criminal proceedings. See id. at 59–60.    
 197. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, 
supra note 183, at 20–22. 
 198. See supra Parts I.B–C. See generally, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008).  
 199. Here, Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison’s article, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012), provides theoretical support. The article 
incorporates political science scholarship into the professors’ reconceptualization of 
“acquiescence”-based separation-of-powers arguments, concluding with regard to executive-
congressional agreements that putative congressional acquiescence in executive actions should 
receive less weight due to the shortcomings of the Madisonian model of interbranch relations. It 
stands to reason that the inverse should be true, too—that executive-branch acquiescence in 
congressional actions and practices should receive greater weight. 
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Historical gloss suggests that the legislative branch, not the 
executive branch, has the sole authority to make a first determination 
as to the applicability of the protections of the Speech or Debate 
Clause. This ultimately is a question of the Clause’s scope, but not as 
framed in United States v. Renzi.200 The question is not whether the 
scope of the clause encompasses an absolute privilege against any 
compelled disclosure, but is rather a question of procedure—
Congress, not the executive branch, gets to make first determinations 
as to privilege. 
D. Normative Considerations Support the Formalist Analysis 
This tentative conclusion is supported by normative 
considerations. The Clause’s nondisclosure protection is not designed 
to safeguard legislators’ independence. The Renzi court’s 
characterization of the Rayburn holding—which it described as 
resting upon nothing more than a “distraction rationale” hinged upon 
the word “question” and D.C. Circuit precedent—missed the point.201 
Any court should discount a nondisclosure rule that is based solely on 
avoiding legislators’ distraction. 
Instead, the Clause protects democratic representation.202 As in 
other separation-of-powers contexts, the Clause’s institutional 
protection focuses on practical control.203 Recognition that the Clause 
provides an institutional protection will ultimately be determinative of 
whether investigations of congressional criminality take place via 
subpoenas, which preserve the congressional right of prior assertion, 
 
 200. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011) (framing the Clause’s 
“nondisclosure privilege” as an extension of a Member’s testimonial privilege). 
 201. For a description of this aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s holding, see supra note 122.  
 202. Legislative independence is not primarily constitutionally valuable as an end in itself; 
its value is the instrumental role it plays in fostering democratic representation. See, e.g., Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (“[The Clause] ensures that legislators are free to 
represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will later be called to task in 
the courts for that representation.”); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972) 
(discussing the public’s right to honest representation). For historical evidence supporting this 
point, see supra note 55. 
 203. Compare Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972) (“Rather than giving the 
Clause a cramped construction the Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of 
freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control 
his conduct as legislator.”), with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1985) (holding that the 
Comptroller General is part of the executive branch, rather than the legislative branch, because 
he is removable by Congress, and that “to permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an 
officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over 
the execution of the laws”). 
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or via searches, which do not.204 To vest in the legislative branch a 
privilege to protect it from the other branches while at the same time 
allowing the executive branch to make an initial determination about 
which materials the privilege protects fatally undermines that 
protection, regardless of whether executive-branch officials are acting 
in good faith. Although a filter team’s presumptive determination of 
the applicability of the Clause might accommodate valuable 
executive-branch and constituent interests—among them effectively 
combatting corruption205—“the Framers ranked other values higher 
than efficiency.”206 Moreover, as this Note proceeds to discuss, 
executive-branch searches—even those using filter teams—differ 
functionally from subpoenas in important ways. 
IV.  NONDISCLOSURE AS SEPARATION OF POWERS: A (MODIFIED) 
FUNCTIONALIST READING 
A formalist rationale suffices to resolve the easier case 
(Rayburn): the executive branch cannot determine the applicability of 
the Speech or Debate Clause in the first instance.207 Formalist 
reasoning is insufficient, however, to resolve the issue presented in 
Renzi and future investigations of congressional criminal wrongdoing: 
namely, how to accommodate “law enforcement tools ‘that have 
never been considered problematic’”208 given the executive branch’s 
Article II, Section 3 interest to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.” The Clause does not exempt Members from criminal 
responsibility generally,209 and discerning the line at which 
congressionally determined procedural prerequisites become de facto 
 
 204. As noted in Judge Henderson’s Rayburn concurrence, rejecting a nondisclosure 
protection would favor executive-branch searches over subpoenas, as searches avoid the active 
response that triggers the Clause’s prohibition on questioning. United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 205. See Harrell, supra note 9, at 404–08 (arguing that a “Corruption Principle,” similar in 
constitutional value to federalism, tips the scales in favor of reading out of the Court’s 
jurisprudence that the Clause encompasses any evidentiary privilege). For further discussion of 
a corruption principle, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 341, 342 (2009). 
 206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); see Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (“[F]ailure of political will does not justify unconstitutional 
remedies.”). 
 207. See supra Part III. 
 208. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rayburn, 497 F.3d 
at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 209. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972). 
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substantive immunity under the auspices of protecting legislative 
independence is the realm of pure functionalism. 
This Part demonstrates that functionalist separation-of-powers 
analysis—as reconceived in Professor John Manning’s article 
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation—reaches the same 
conclusion as the above formalist analysis on the facts in Rayburn, 
before applying functionalist analysis to Renzi. It first summarizes 
Professor Manning’s contribution to the understanding of 
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis,210 then outlines the 
legislative interests courts might weigh against the executive branch’s 
“take care” interest. Next, it highlights the role of the governmental 
branches relative to one another, before concluding that interbranch 
accommodation is best left to Congress and the executive branch in 
the first instance. 
A. The Functionalist Argument 
In Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, Professor 
Manning argues that a freestanding separation-of-powers principle 
cannot negate ordinary means of constitutional interpretation.211 This 
means that in interpreting the Constitution, courts should apply 
principles of statutory interpretation, like “the specific controls the 
general,”212 rather than rule on the basis of separationist or balance-
of-powers theories of the separation of powers.213 Manning reasons 
from a view of the Constitution as a series of political compromises 
made during the Constitutional Convention, some of which are very 
specific. He argues that courts should respect not only these specific 
compromises—like the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, 
which “carefully divide statutemaking power among three 
institutions”214—but also the Constitution’s indeterminacies, which 
evince a decision to leave certain determinations to future 
 
 210. Though I am confident that Professor Manning does not consider himself to be a 
functionalist, that does not mean that his contributions cannot be appropriated to inform 
functionalist separation-of-powers theory. See generally Peter L. Strauss, A Softer Formalism, 
124 HARV. L. REV. F. 55 (2011). 
 211. Manning, supra note 20, at 1944. 
 212. See id. at 2008–11 (citing the decisions in Chadha and Bowsher as following this 
principle, as the outcomes were dictated by the specifics of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 and 
Article III, Section 1, rather than the general Necessary and Proper power). 
 213. For examples of “balance-of-powers” rationales, see supra notes 20–21. 
 214. Manning, supra note 20, at 1982.  
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generations; determinations to be made by Congress pursuant to the 
Necessary and Proper power.215 
The Supreme Court’s test for functionalist separation-of-powers 
claims is whether a challenged action potentially prevents a branch of 
government from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions without that adverse impact being justified by an overriding 
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of 
another branch.216 It is, on its face, a balancing test. Incorporating 
Professor Manning’s insights makes clear, however, that proper 
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis does not simply balance 
interests; it also considers whether this balancing is more 
appropriately done by courts or by Congress.217 
B. The Interests at Stake in Rayburn 
Turning to the interests at stake in Rayburn, searches of 
congressional offices compel access to legislative-act material 
immediately rather than in the due course of a subpoena response. 
This does more than merely distract legislators, the sole functionalist 
concern acknowledged by the Renzi court.218 Searches also (1) deter 
legislative candor, (2) impede the oversight function, and (3) 
circumvent Congress’s institutional role. 
1. Deter Legislative Candor.  The prospect of compelled 
disclosure of legislative-act material will deter legislators—including 
those who themselves will never become the target of 
investigations—from documenting or expressing their opinions with 
candor, especially those opinions that are not politically popular.219 
 
 215. See supra note 180. 
 216. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (distilling this 
constitutional test from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).  
 217. Cf. Manning, supra note 20 at 1975 (“[W]hen a court abstracts from the specific to the 
general, the level of generality at which it enforces statutory policy reflects judicial, and not 
legislative, choice.”). 
 218. Cf. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (characterizing Rayburn 
as based solely on a distraction rationale); supra note 122. 
 219. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 (“Human experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for 
their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”). It is beyond the scope of 
this Note to document exactly how much of this exchange of ideas takes place in writing, or to 
hypothesize whether the prospect of easier or more difficult executive-branch exposure to 
legislative-act material might lead to media shifting (perhaps to verbal-only communication), 
and whether this would be good or bad for democratic representation. 
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This basic deterrence effect is compounded because executive-branch 
officials are often in no position to know what is or is not legitimate 
legislative activity, and thus will, even in the best of faith, fail to 
identify legitimate legislative-act materials, resulting in false 
positives.220 A right of prior assertion resting solely in the individual 
Member whose office is being searched will not mitigate this 
deterrence, because an individual Member is likely to systematically 
discount the value of protecting legislative materials not pertaining to 
her own conduct.221 
2. Impede the Oversight Function.  Compelled disclosure of 
legislative-act material is incompatible with Congress’s oversight 
function, as Congress may be investigating the very agency 
conducting the search.222 This nearly occurred in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, when the FBI began investigating possible 
leaks from the two congressional intelligence committees, which in 
turn were investigating “possible mistakes made by the U.S. 
intelligence agencies, including the FBI, CIA and NSA.”223 A possible 
constitutional crisis was avoided by the Department of Justice’s 
working with both Congressional Counsels in developing a request 
procedure to protect Congress’s right to prior assertion of the Speech 
or Debate privilege.224 As it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain 
 
 220. For example, House Counsel may be called on to respond to a subpoena seeking what 
would look like nonprotected material to a neutral third party. In one instance, “House Counsel 
represented a Member who, because of a personal family tragedy, had developed a legislative 
interest in a particular drug.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal 
Advocacy Group, supra note 76, at 30 n.21. After screening each document in the 
Congressman’s possession, House Counsel determined that all but a “handful” of the 
documents were protected legislative-act material; the unprotected materials included “press 
releases and communications with federal regulatory agencies unrelated to the legislative 
process.” Id.; see also Huefner, supra note 21, at 324 (suggesting the possible harm to other 
Members and to the House as an institution from inquiry into documents peripherally related 
to—but not part of—Congressman Jefferson’s alleged corruption). 
  Offsetting this deterrence mechanism does not require what some have argued is a 
corollary protection, requiring that the legislature determine the scope of its own privilege 
and/or punish Members within its Article I, Section 5 power. See supra note 52. It does, 
however, require that Congress have the right to prior assertion. 
 221. See Tiefer, supra note 195, at 59–62 (noting that the interests of Congress as an 
institution and those of its members often diverge during investigations). 
 222. For a discussion of the oversight function, see supra Part I.C. 
 223. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group, 
supra note 76, at 32–33. 
 224. Id. 
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classified information from the executive branch,225 such protective 
space for congressional investigations is of increasing importance to 
ensure that the executive branch remains politically accountable and 
that Congress is able to access the information it needs to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibilities.226 
3. Circumvent Congress’s Institutional Role.  Despite the above 
problems, one might argue that, in terms of the balance of powers 
between branches, executive-branch searches of congressional offices 
using filter teams are not functionally different than congressional 
prior assertion in response to subpoenas. One might even argue for 
their superiority, as searches might enhance legislative independence 
while furthering the executive-branch interest in policing 
corruption.227 The formalist objection to this argument is that such 
balance-of-power considerations simply do not matter.228 Even in 
functionalist terms, however, such searches are emphatically not the 
functional equivalent of subpoenas. Searches for documents render 
ineffective Congress’s ability to retain institutional control over its 
materials in the face of a subpoena, and they grant access to the 
 
 225. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 226. Congress often needs to access information from the executive branch in order to carry 
out its constitutional responsibilities, including its responsibility to legislate. See supra note 62. 
 227. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ability of the 
Executive to adequately investigate and prosecute corrupt legislators for non-protected 
activity . . . is of paramount importance to the Legislative branch itself, . . . [as] ‘financial abuses 
by way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, would gravely undermine 
legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation.’ . . . Were we to 
join the D.C. Circuit . . . we would thus only harm legislative independence.” (quoting United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524–25 (1972))); cf. Harrell, supra note 9 at 405 (arguing for an 
“anti-corruption principle”). For a further discussion of whether prosecution or immunity best 
protects legislative independence, see generally Simon Wigley, Parliamentary Immunity: 
Protecting Democracy or Protecting Corruption?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 23 (2003). 
 228. See supra note 206 and accompanying text; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 
(1983) (“[P]olicy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the 
demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out just how those powers are to 
be exercised.”). The formalist might also note that functionalist concerns—if they are 
appropriate at all—are secondary to formalist analysis; thus, one does not even get to balancing 
legislative independence against executive-branch enforcement interests. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that although formalist and functionalist separation-of-powers analyses are not 
mutually exclusive constitutional arguments, formalist analysis has lexical priority. See Clinton 
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (“[B]ecause we conclude that the Act’s 
cancellation provisions violate [the Presentment requirement], we find it unnecessary to 
consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act ‘impermissibly disrupts the balance 
of powers among the three branches of government.’” (quoting City of New York v. Clinton, 
985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C. 1998))). 
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legislative-act materials of other Members and of congressional 
committees without the benefit of institutional participation in the 
adversarial process.229 
* * * 
Given these interests, the Ninth Circuit was clearly incorrect in 
its claim that “Rayburn rests on the notion that . . . distraction alone 
can . . . serve as a touchstone for application of the Clause’s 
testimonial privilege.”230 Rayburn would come out the same under 
functionalist analysis as under formalist analysis because searches of 
congressional offices potentially prevent the legislative branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, and the impact 
is not justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
executive branch’s own constitutional authority.231 
A possible objection to this conclusion is that a partisan 
Congress might interfere with a legitimate prosecution by an 
executive branch controlled by the opposite political party. At face 
value, this objection might suggest the need for further refinement of 
Rule VIII to ensure that it reflects Congress’s institutional interest in 
the Speech or Debate Clause protection. It more likely understates 
the measured involvement of House and Senate Counsels in 
determining the applicability of Speech or Debate protections. Yet it 
also arguably follows from the very rationale for the Speech or 
Debate Clause—the ability to resist the executive branch as a matter 
of political power.232 
C. Nondisclosure Contrasted with Bribery Prosecutions 
Each of the above rationales in support of the conclusion that 
searches of congressional offices violate the Clause applies equally to 
bribery prosecutions. Bribery investigations deter legitimate 
legislative activity because the inquiries they necessitate expose 
candid—potentially impolitic, but legitimate—legislative 
undertakings.233 They present the potential for executive-branch 
officials to influence or control a Member’s decisions by threat of 
 
 229. See Reckless Justice, supra note 71, at 15–16 (statement of Charles Tiefer, Professor, 
University of Baltimore Law School) (noting that the difference between subpoenas and 
searches is the absence of an adversarial process).  
 230. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034. 
 231. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 233. Cf. supra Part IV.B.1.  
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indictment,234 undermining the integrity of the legislative process,235 
potentially compromising the oversight function,236 and arguably 
circumventing Congress’s institutional role under Article I, Section 
5.237 At first glance, these similarities should seem problematic to the 
reader, because the Clause permits bribery prosecutions, whereas this 
Note has argued that it does not permit searches of congressional 
offices. 
This is where the difference between balance-of-powers 
arguments and separation-of-powers analysis matters: bribery 
prosecutions do not circumvent the Clause because Congress has 
authorized the executive branch to investigate bribery.238 As noted by 
the Court in Brewster, Congress retains the ability to constrain its 
authorization of bribery prosecutions in a number of ways.239 Until it 
does so, it appears that Congress has determined that prosecutions 
for bribery protect the integrity of the legislative process in a way that 
enhances, rather than harms, democratic representation.240 Put 
otherwise, Congress has already done the balancing. Courts’ leaving 
 
 234. See Ervin, supra note 52, at 191 (“[T]he mere threat of government inquiry into a 
campaign contribution on the grounds of a possible violation of the bribery statutes can act as a 
powerful political deterrent on Congressmen and Senators. It is a political fact of life that 
rumors of criminal violations and threats of official investigations can seriously affect the 
independence of a legislator.”). 
 235. See Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 492–95 (demonstrating the potential for the 
Executive to control legislators’ behavior); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 522 
n.16 (1972) (acknowledging that “[t]he potential for harassment by an unscrupulous member of 
the Executive branch may exist” and that “[a] strategically timed indictment could indeed cause 
serious harm to a Congressman”).  
 236. Subpoenaing individuals to inform Congress requires knowledge, which, in turn, 
requires a voluntary source of information—a source that Members cannot protect, as 
determined in Gravel. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628 (1972). For a description of 
the Court’s holding in Gravel, see supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra note 52.  
 238. The federal bribery statute applies to Members of Congress on its face. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘public official’ means Member of Congress . . . .’”). Members 
are not immunized from criminal prosecution, see supra note 209 and accompanying text, and 
investigations of any number of crimes may find their ways to the feet of sitting representatives.  
 239. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972) (“If we underestimate the 
potential for harassment, the Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Members from the ambit 
of federal bribery laws, but it has deliberately allowed the instant statute to remain on the books 
for over a century.”). It stands to reason that any attempt by Congress to exempt its Members 
from criminal statutes generally—rather than from those implicated solely by their exercise of 
their congressional offices—would raise the specter of an Equal Protection Clause violation. 
See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and 
Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 116 (1994) (noting this 
potential constitutional problem). 
 240. Cf. supra notes 217, 227 and accompanying text. 
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this decision to Congress avoids constitutionalizing this determination 
on the basis of vague notions about the optimal balance of powers 
that are subject to change with each generation and/or presidential 
administration. 
D. Accommodating Law-Enforcement Tools That Have Never Been 
Considered Problematic 
Having argued in Part IV.B that Rayburn comes out the same 
under functionalist analysis as under formalist analysis, and then in 
Part IV.C having distinguished between this functionalist reasoning 
and balance-of-powers arguments, this Section now applies functional 
separation-of-powers analysis to offer a basis for distinguishing 
between procedural prerequisites to investigating Members and de 
facto substantive immunity.241 Reading Renzi as a separation-of-
powers case demonstrates that it is possible to respect the executive 
branch’s prerogative to investigate Members’ criminality without 
unduly imposing upon legislative independence in violation of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Renzi is a good prototype for the question 
of whether the Speech or Debate Clause forecloses “law enforcement 
tools that have never been considered problematic”—not because the 
case would have come out differently under the above analysis,242 but 
because it demonstrates what these law-enforcement tools are.243 
Although individual Members do not have an absolute 
“nondisclosure privilege,”244 the Speech or Debate Clause requires 
more than ex parte permission from a court to use investigatory 
methods that will result in necessary exposure to legislative-act 
materials.245 Like the search in Rayburn, investigations that use 
wiretaps—like the one at issue in in Renzi—necessarily result in 
executive-branch exposure to legislative-act materials. The Clause’s 
nondisclosure protection—Congress’s right to the prior assertion of 
 
 241. This Section does not engage in the formalist analysis from Part III because of space 
constraints and because no legacy of executive-branch or congressional acquiescence in an 
agreed-upon arrangement regarding wiretaps exists. Instead, the executive branch has 
historically used wiretaps to surveil Members, though such conduct has often been used to 
secure political gain rather than for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. See Brief for 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae at 27–
29, United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-10088, 10-10122).  
 242. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra Part III. 
 245. For commentary on ex parte access to legislative-act materials, see supra notes 84, 229 
and accompanying text. 
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its institutional interests—requires, in addition to a Title III wiretap 
application, the executive branch’s cooperation with Congress to 
protect Congress’s right to the prior assertion of the Speech or 
Debate Clause; cooperation that can take place through House or 
Senate Counsel. It is beyond the scope of this Note to articulate 
exactly how this will work in practice. Instead, Rayburn counsels that 
“how that accommodation is to be achieved is best determined by the 
legislative and executive branches in the first instance,” and past 
experience shows that such accommodation works in practice.246 
This conclusion is not a wild departure from past practice, nor 
does it foreshadow de facto congressional immunity. Like seventy 
Members before him,247 Congressman Jefferson was convicted without 
reliance upon legislative-act materials.248 Putting aside the fact that 
both Congressmen Jefferson and Renzi were convicted, conferring 
with House Counsel about Members’ apparent wrongdoing is a 
desirable first step in any investigation of congressional wrongdoing 
given the possibility not only of targeted prosecutions and/or 
intimidation,249 but also of stumbling upon legitimate false positives.250 
CONCLUSION 
Although the D.C. Circuit did not write its opinion in United 
States v. Rayburn House Office Building as a separation-of-powers 
case, the opinion should be read as one. This Note has recast Rayburn 
through separation-of-powers analysis to demonstrate the limited 
nature of Rayburn’s holding. Had the Ninth Circuit conducted such 
analysis in United States v. Renzi, it could have avoided announcing 
 
 246. For examples of such accommodation working in practice, see supra notes 78–80, 222–
24 and accompanying text.  
 247. Jonathan J. Cooper, Members of Congress Charged with a Crime, 1798–2008, WASH. 
INDEP., (July 29, 2008, 5:31 PM), http://washingtonindependent.com/377/members-of-congress-
charged-with-a-crime-1798-2008. 
 248. Congressman Jefferson was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia, which 
declined “the government’s invitation to reconsider the constitutionality of the search” of his 
congressional office as determined in Rayburn. See United States v. Jefferson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 
448, 451 (E.D. Va. 2009). Congressman Renzi was also convicted. Aaron Blake, Ex-Rep. Rick 
Renzi Sentenced to Three Years in Prison, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013, 3:56 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/10/28/ex-rep-rick-renzi-sentenced-
to-three-years-in-prison. At the time this Note was published, his appeal was still pending. 
Defendant Richard G. Renzi’s Notice of Appeal, United States v. Renzi, No. 13-10588 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 8, 2013). 
 249. See supra notes 16 and 235 and accompanying text.  
 250. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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misleading dicta regarding the nature of the Speech or Debate 
Clause’s nondisclosure protection. Renzi’s dicta holds the potential to 
confound law-enforcement personnel, magistrate judges, and other 
federal courts of appeal, and to forge a new path of least resistance 
toward the use of search warrants, rather than subpoenas, in 
congressional investigations. 
Procedural protections and criminal prosecutions both have a 
place in protecting political representation, and recognizing the 
limited nature of the holding in Rayburn is essential to 
accommodating both the Speech or Debate protection and the 
executive branch’s enforcement interest. The D.C. Circuit’s 
construction of the Speech or Debate Clause in Rayburn leaves 
executive-branch officials considerable latitude in investigating 
Members of Congress, subject to procedural constraints, which they 
may choose to navigate by coordinating with their legislative-branch 
counterparts. The Speech or Debate Clause protects legislative—not 
legislators’—independence. Its nondisclosure protection provides 
Congress the right to assert its institutional interests prior to the 
executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of legislative-act 
materials. 
